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Philippines: Designing a Local Government Enhancement Fund
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the internal revenue allotment, has been criticized for: its inability to equalize
sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer municipalities and provinces, and its funds not having
been spent efficiently. For some time, LGUs have petitioned the Government of the Philippines
to expand the funding of the IRA. However, there appears to be ample consensus that any
additional funding needs to be distributed in a manner that addresses the design flaws of the IRA.
In this paper, options for the design of a possible new transfer, the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure
Performance Fund, separate from the IRA, are outlined. Such design faces four major challenges:
(i) how to define the origin and computation of the additional funding, (ii) how to divide the
additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays), (iii) what formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs
in each particular group of LGUs, and (iv) how to ensure that LGUs will use the additional funds to
improve their service delivery performance. The transfer mechanism suggested as a result offers a
bridge toward the eventual review and reform of the IRA.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the internal revenue allotment (IRA), has been criticized for (i) its inability to
equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer municipalities and provinces; and (ii) its
funds failing to be spent in an efficient manner. Recently, LGU associations have petitioned the
Government of the Philippines for an expansion of the funding of the IRA from 40% of internal
revenue collection to 50%, and several draft bills toward this goal have been prepared.
Most agree that if the additional 10% of funding were to occur, these funds should not be
distributed following the same methodology used for the IRA. The distribution of the additional
funds needs to have a much stronger equalization effect among LGUs, and the recipient LGUs
should be held accountable to use the funds to improve the performance of public services.
The new transfer so far has been called the Local Government Enhancement Fund, but
this paper proposes a more descriptive name, the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance
Fund (FEEP).
The design of the new transfer with 10% additional funding, separate from the IRA, will
face four major challenges: (i) defining the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding,
(ii) apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays [neighborhoods]), (iii) defining a formula to use for the
distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs, and
(iv) ensuring that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery
performance.
For the first challenge, two main options are explored in this paper: (i) using the same
base as the IRA, which is internal revenue collection; or (ii) using the broader base of total
national revenues, which expands the IRA base to include all collections by the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Internal Revenue. The potentially important difference between these
two approaches is how the two bases will perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint
of their volatility. Although there is some evidence that the broader base (i.e., total revenues)
exhibits more volatility over time, the differences are not significant. Therefore, there is not a
clear preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.
Several other less orthodox options for obtaining the additional funding are also
explored. First, funding of the IRA could be frozen as of 2011, holding all LGUs in future years
to the same funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011, and utilizing the increases in
nominal pesos from the 40% formula for the IRA to finance and expand the FEEP. This means
that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA would increase over the years, and it is an
indirect way to reform the IRA. Second, some of the resources currently distributed through the
government conditional transfers to the FEEP could be shifted, in particular special funds to the
budgets of sector agencies (e.g., agriculture) that may not be used or that are inefficiently
utilized. Third, the introduction of negative transfers from wealthier LGUs to the FEEP could be
considered.
For the second challenge, apportioning the additional funding among the different
groups of LGUs, an option is to modify the current apportionment percentages used in the IRA
by excluding barangays from the vertical distribution and distributing their share proportionally to
the other LGU groups. Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that
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provides 23% of the funds to provinces, 23% to cities, 34% to municipalities, and 20% to
barangays. This proposal, however, produces shares of 28.75% each for provinces and cities,
and 42.50% for municipalities. A second option focuses on the vertical distribution among
provinces, cities, and municipalities being proportional to their respective aggregate positive
fiscal gaps. The apportionment percentages under this approach becomes about 15% for
provinces, 18% for cities, and 67% for municipalities. The advantage of both approaches is that
they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to a new rule that is arbitrarily
derived.
Fundamentally, this second approach is the only sound approach to the derivation of the
vertical distribution rule. However, in the future, true expenditure needs of the different LGU
groups have to be derived; this paper uses a historical approximation of expenditure needs, and
there is no reason to expect the two measures of expenditure needs to coincide. Different
methodologies were used to compute the expenditure needs of LGUs.
The section focusing on the third challenge, defining a formula to use for the distribution
of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each group of LGUs, develops several approaches
for distribution of the new available funds. Under the new distribution rules, not all LGUs would
get funds. Second, the distribution of funds is based on the quantification of the fiscal gap
concept, which is the difference between expenditure needs of an LGU and its fiscal capacity to
raise revenues.
Before discussing and computing the concepts of fiscal gap, expenditure needs, and
fiscal capacity, the paper presents a formula to distribute the funds in each LGU group that is
similar but significantly improves upon the current formula used for the IRA (i.e., a weighted
index of population, land area, and equal shares). The improved, weighted index introduces
additional factors to population and land area (e.g., youth and elderly populations and the
incidence of poverty) to proxy the differences in expenditure needs. It also introduces an
additional factor in the weighted index to account for the differences in fiscal capacity across
LGUs. Note that the new improved index eliminates the equal share factor currently used in the
IRA. However, under this expanded weighted index approach, all LGUs still receive some FEEP
funds. That is not the case with the fiscal gap approach that follows.
The core approach to the distribution of funds within each group of LGUs consists of the
estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different methodologies available for the
estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, and it implements, with 2008 data, two
measures for the estimation of expenditure needs and two measures for the estimation of fiscal
capacity.
The simulations of the FEEP transfers are carried out with the different methodologies
assuming two different vertical allocation rules across LGU groups. The first is a modified IRA
allocation rule, excluding barangays, and the results are reproduced in the first table below. The
second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each group of LGUs, and the
results are reproduced in the second table below. Note that using the fiscal gap approach allows
restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap (i.e., where
expenditure needs exceed fiscal capacity).
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Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers under
Proportional Allocation and Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment Vertical
Distribution Rule, 2008
(P)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(P million)

Provinces
0
2,031.23
126.42
326.42
2.58
15,376.74

Cities
0
4,445.48
576.52
1,016.61
1.76
15,376.74

Municipalities
0
9,068.76
315.71
669.30
2.12
22,730.83

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.

Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers under
Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal Gap Vertical
Distribution Rule, 2008
(P)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(P million)

Provinces
0
127.17
7.92
20.44
2.58
9,627.18

Cities
0
3,213.12
416.70
734.79
1.76
11,114.03

Municipalities
0
16,520.08
575.12
1,219.23
2.12
41,407.54

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.

The last section of the paper addresses the fourth challenge, ensuring that the additional
FEEP funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to
using ex-ante conditionality for receiving these additional funds, the paper proposes to use
ex-post performance indicators, which preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The
carefully selected performance indicators need to be measured independently from the LGUs
themselves and should be meaningful regarding the quality of life of LGU residents. The
indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to outcomes, given that the local
jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. Because of very different
starting points in most indicators for various LGUs, performance needs to be read as
differentiated changes in the selected indicators.
Failure to deliver improved performance in the set period would be followed by
suspension of one-half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance,
the funding could be completely suspended with continued failure to improve, or fully restored
with increased performance. Although the paper explores past experience in the Philippines
with performance indicators and the several possibilities available, the actual selection of the
performance indicators requires further study.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units1 (LGUs) in
the Philippines is the internal revenue allotment (IRA), introduced in 2001. The IRA has been
criticized for two main failings.2 The first is its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially
regarding poorer municipalities and provinces. The second is the feeling that the IRA funds, to a
large extent unconditional in their use by LGUs, have not been spent in an efficient manner to
improve the daily life of citizens.
Recently, LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines for an
expansion of the funding of the IRA from 40% of internal revenue collections to 50%. Although
there is not full agreement on this expansion, the possibility of more funding is being seriously
considered by the executive and legislative branches. Within the government, most agree that if
the additional 10% in funding were to occur, these funds should not be distributed following the
same methodology used for the IRA.3
Two general requirements for implementing the additional 10% funding are often
mentioned.4 The first is that the additional funds must have a much stronger equalization effect
among LGUs.5 The second is that accountability should increase for how the recipient LGUs
use the funds to improve the performance of public services. These two general objectives are
also desired goals for IRA reform.
The design of the new transfer, named by this paper as the Fiscal Equity and
Expenditure Performance Fund (FEEP),6 comprises the 10% additional funding and is separate
from the IRA. Although reform of the IRA is not politically viable at this time, the FEEP can
become a model for its eventual reform if the IRA overall allocation is frozen in a hold-harmless
position for all LGU recipients in a base year, for example 2011, and annual nominal increments
in the IRA funding are moved to the FEEP.7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

These include provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, the equivalent of neighborhoods. The relationships
between different LGUs, and especially those of cities and municipalities with the barangays, are examined in
several essays in Preschle and Sosmeña (2007).
See Government of the Philippines, DILG (2009) for a recent assessment of the decentralization system in the
Philippines.
See Pardo (2005), Brillantes (2005), and Guevara (2006, 2007) for discussions of the problems associated with the
current design of the IRA and proposals for reform.
The draft bill on the LGU Enhancement Fund (not an official name) provides that the additional 10% should be
allocated according to the two criteria of equity and performance. Some of the available drafts of the bill include a
concrete split of the 10% funds into 5% for equity adjustments and 5% for performance.
Several proposals have been made for reforming the IRA; the most recent is by JICA (2008). Also, see Manasan
and Chaterjee (2003) and World Bank (2010) for the existing and growing inequality and lack of economic
convergence across geographical regions in the Philippines. A more recent assessment of the impact of
decentralization in the Philippines can be found in Brillantes et al. (2010).
The proposals for this initiative have used the term Local Government Enhancement Fund. This report proposes
the new, more descriptive name of FEEP.
One issue to take into account may be the proliferation of special funds in the intergovernment finance system of
the Philippines. However, the FEEP will have very different features and objectives than other existing funds. The
Special Education Fund was introduced in the Local Government Code of 2001 and earmarks the proceeds from
an additional 1% tax on real property to support school boards. See Manasan and Castel (2010) for a discussion of
issues related to this fund. The Performance Challenge Fund that is being created for LGUs will have considerably
smaller funding than the FEEP (i.e., P500 million). It will be dedicated to matching high-impact capital infrastructure
projects, and it will follow a completely different approach to LGU performance. The Performance Challenge Fund
will confer a “seal of good housekeeping” to prequalifying LGUs focusing on the areas of administrative good
governance.
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This paper explores the four major challenges facing the design of the FEEP:
(i)
Defining the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding. The
base of the funding could be internal revenue collections, as in the case of the
IRA, or something different. LGU associations have requested use of total
government revenues for the IRA. Thus, the advantages and disadvantages of
the different choices, and other alternatives, are explored.
(ii)
Apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of local
government units (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays).
One possibility is to use the current apportionment percentages in the IRA.
However, there is widespread perception that the initial arbitrariness of the IRA
apportionment percentages is part of the problem, causing the significant and
increasing fiscal disparities among groups of LGUs. Other options are thus
explored.
(iii)
Distributing the additional funds for qualifying local government units in
each group. Most agree on the need to improve the current formula used for the
IRA distributions based on a weighted index of population, land area, and equal
shares. Further, more accurate measurement of the expenditure needs of LGUs
is required than that provided by the population, area, and equal shares in the
IRA formula. Some measure of fiscal revenue capacity is also needed. This
paper explores new formulas and methodologies given current data availability.
(iv)
Ensuring that the additional funds are used by local government units to
improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using ex-ante
conditionality for the additional funds (e.g., where the money can be spent or
what kind of inputs to use), the goal is to preserve a high degree of autonomy of
LGUs but demand from them ex-post proof of improved performance in a number
of carefully selected indicators. These indicators need to be measured
independently from the LGUs themselves and must be meaningful regarding the
quality of life of residents. Because of very different starting points in most
indicators for various LGUs, the improvements need to be read as differentiated
changes in those indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the set
period could be followed by suspension of one-half of the available funding. After
another round or period of performance, the funding could be completely
suspended with continued failure to improve, or fully restored with increased
performance.

II.

DEFINING THE ORIGIN AND COMPUTATION
OF THE 10% ADDITIONAL FUNDING

Even though it is uncertain that the additional funding approved for the FEEP will be an extra
10%,8 it is necessary to make this assumption to go forward with this paper.
The next question concerns the source of the 10% additional funding. From a political
and economic perspective, it is important to disassociate the FEEP and its funding from the IRA
to mute legalist interpretations that since the increment in funding is based on the IRA, so
should the distribution formula. That is, it is imperative to make clear that the FEEP is not part of
the IRA, since it pursues very different objectives with different means.
There are several alternatives that can be explored to determine the funding rule for the
FEEP:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

8

Using the same base as for the internal revenue allotment. A simple answer
is to use the current arrangement under the IRA, increasing the allotment from
the current 40% of the IRA to 50%. This funding is based on collections from the
National Internal Revenue Code, comprising internal revenue taxes or taxes
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such as all income taxes, transfer
taxes, excise taxes on domestic trade, value-added taxes (VATs) on domestic
trade, other business taxes, documentary stamp taxes, and other miscellaneous
taxes. This approach can use the machinations already in place for the
distribution of the IRA. It also preserves certain revenue sources, such as
customs revenues and fuel taxes, for the central government. However, this
approach also links the FEEP too directly and explicitly with the existing IRA,
creating future problems when the formula for the distribution of funds will differ
between the two. In addition, it may not be the most responsive to the requests
for additional funding from the LGU associations, which have also been
requesting broadening the IRA base to all national tax revenues, including
customs revenues and fuel taxes.
Using an expanded base from central government total revenues. This
alternative uses a broader base, specifically all central government revenues,
including customs taxes and fuel taxes, to compute the 10% additional funding
for the FEEP. In absolute terms for the base year, this means the same revenues
as in (i). Thus, rather than adding 10 percentage points to the IRA computation,
the same amount of funds is derived by multiplying national tax revenues by x%.
However, over time, the absolute amount in pesos could become different if that
initial x% is kept and the national tax revenues and internal revenues evolve
differently. This approach has the advantage of partially fulfilling one standing
request of the LGU associations to use total central government revenues for the
IRA, but it entails a potentially larger commitment of funds by the central
government over time.
Other less conventional approaches. One possibility is to freeze the funding of
the IRA as of 2011, for example, holding all LGUs in future years to the same
funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011. Then, the increases in
nominal pesos from the 40% formula for the IRA could be used to finance and
expand the FEEP. This would mean that the importance of the FEEP regarding
the IRA would increase over the years, and the FEEP would become a good

In the authors’ preliminary meetings, other figures were mentioned, including, for example, additional funding of
only 5%.
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model for IRA reform. A second approach is to shift some of the resources
currently distributed through government conditional transfers to the FEEP. In
particular, there appears to be special funds in the budgets of sector agencies
(e.g., agriculture) that are either unused or inefficiently utilized. A third possibility
is to consider the introduction of negative transfers from wealthier LGUs to the
FEEP. Several countries finance their equalization grants fully or partially with
such fraternal systems (also known as Robin Hood systems) of finance. Here,
LGUs that have a negative fiscal gap, defined as the difference between
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, are required to contribute to a centrally
managed equalization fund. This approach has the potential of significantly
lowering the fiscal costs to the central government of introducing the FEEP.
However, it implies that IRA reform may be politically unviable. The introduction
of a fraternal system of finance, being new to the Philippines, may face strong
opposition by LGUs.
The two more feasible strategies for funding the FEEP are (i) and (ii). Although
(ii) includes a wider revenue base, since it includes customs revenues and fuel taxes, it is
unclear that it would be superior to the internal revenue base in (i) from all perspectives, such as
stability and predictability.

Figure 1: Evolution of Selected Tax Instruments as Share
of Gross Domestic Product in Asia, 1975–2005

Sources: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm),
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators)

World

Bank

In terms of revenue trends, customs taxes represent a declining revenue source
because future trade and tariff reforms are likely to lower the level and to narrow the dispersion
of tariff rates. This trend is illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of Asian countries, where it can be
seen that the share of customs taxes (the largest component by far of taxes on international
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trade) has decreased vis-à-vis the shares of income taxes and taxes on goods and services.9
The declining relative importance over time of taxes on international trade is not an exclusive
phenomenon for Asia but can be observed in most regions of the world, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Taxes on International Trade as a Share
of Gross Domestic Product by Region, 1972–2005

EU = European Union.
Note: EU15+ includes the 15 EU countries, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
Sources: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm),
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators)

World

Bank

In offsetting the expected declining trend in customs taxes, increasing trends in other
taxes collected at customs needs to be taken into account. The revenues collected by the
Bureau of Customs include VATs and all excise duties falling on imported commodities, such as
those on fuel products. Clearly, revenues from these sources can dwarf the revenues coming
from import tariffs. In many developing countries, about one-half of VAT revenues are collected
by customs offices. As for excise duties, that share can be even higher. As can be seen in
Figure 1, the trend in Asian countries is for taxes on goods and services to continue to increase
their share in total tax revenues at the expense of customs taxes and also income taxes.
The next question is, however, whether expanding the revenue base of the FEEP to
national total revenues would expose recipient LGUs to greater volatility and unpredictability
than if the internal revenue base was used. The issues of volatility and predictability, not only
the total pool of resources, were considered in the design of the IRA since the funds actually
distributed in any one year correspond to the internal revenue collections of previous years.

9

The data are from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics and originally reported in
Martínez-Vázquez (2010). Note that the Philippines are not included in the group of Asian countries, as this data
source does not carry information for the Philippines.
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Table 1: Variation in Total Government Revenues and Selected Tax Revenues, 1990–2007

Total revenue
Personal income tax
Corporate income tax
General sales tax
Excise duties
Customs duties

Standard
Deviation
1.5
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.6
1.0

Mean
16.5
2.2
2.6
1.8
2.5
3.6

Coefficient of
Variation
0.09
0.20
0.16
0.13
0.24
0.29

Minimum
14.4
1.5
1.8
1.5
1.5
2.4

Maximum
19.1
3.4
3.6
2.3
3.4
5.2

Source: Author's calculations based on International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/
gfs.htm)

Some components of the revenues collected by the Bureau of Customs, such as excise
taxes on fuel, can exhibit greater volatility than internal or domestically collected taxes. In
Figures 3 and 4, the two measures of dispersion, the standard deviation and the coefficient of
variation for annual revenue flows of individual revenue components, are the largest for customs
duties. Although the standard deviation for total revenue is higher, once normalized by the mean
value, the coefficient of variation for total revenue is smaller than that of customs duties. Since
the revenues from customs duties are likely highly correlated with the general sales tax and
excise duties collected by the Bureau of Customs, those revenues also exhibit more volatility
than internal revenues, including revenues from the general sales tax and excise duties
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. For the fuel tax, a separate time series is
unavailable. However, a large part of this tax is collected upon importation, and its revenues
(and volatility) are incorporated in the excise duties collected at the Bureau of Customs.

Figure 3: Government Total Revenues and Selected Tax Revenue Collection
(% gross domestic product)

Source: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm)
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Figure 4: Government Total Revenues and Selected Tax Revenue Collection
(% gross domestic product)

VAT = Value-added tax.
Source: Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance.

Figure 5 shows the time evolution of two possible bases, internal revenues versus total
revenues. Independent of the total amounts, the two series follow each other closely. The
coefficient of variation for total revenues is 0.103, and for internal revenues, it is 0.092.
Therefore, expanding the computation base for the FEEP to total revenues (from internal
revenues used now for the IRA) only slightly increases the overall volatility of this transfer with
some increased uncertainty and unpredictability for the recipient LGUs. This additional factor
should be taken into account in deciding the computational base of the FEEP.
Figure 5: Tax Revenue and Internal Revenue Collection
(% gross domestic product)

Source: Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance.

III.

APPORTIONING THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING AMONG THE
DIFFERENT GROUPS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23% of its funds to
provincial governments, 23% to cities, 34% to municipalities, and 20% to barangays. This
vertical distribution formula appears to have been the product of political compromise at the time
of its approval in Parliament as opposed to any calculated weighing of the expenditure needs
and fiscal capacity of the different groups of LGUs.
The choice of vertical distribution shares for the IRA has had important consequences
on the overall performance of that transfer. In particular, there is a widely shared perception that
the share of funds assigned to municipalities has been insufficient and has caused many to
operate under grave fiscal conditions. The perception is also that something similar can be said
for the provinces, many of which seem to be operating with significant difficulties. On the
contrary, cities—the larger, richer cities—have been enjoying funds beyond their needs, even
though there are smaller, relatively poorer cities that are not so well off. For barangays, the
general perception is that there are no alarming financing issues and that they are fine with the
IRA.
The relative poor position of LGUs reflects the fact that the current IRA horizontal
distribution formula may not capture their expenditure needs nor differences in tax or revenue
capacity. However, the current percent shares do not reflect the overall aggregate differences in
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. Unfortunately, the statements above are conjectures
based on field observations of different stakeholders of the decentralization system in the
Philippines as opposed to the results of hard calculations.
Nevertheless, these observations are significant for the vertical allocation of the FEEP.
However, without hard evidence on expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different LGUs,
a sound basis does not exist to recommend any specific vertical allocation rule.
At this stage, there are two ways to proceed. One approach is to allocate the FEEP
vertically only among those groups of LGUs that seem to be in more dire fiscal situations, that
is, municipalities and provinces. Some rule would then need to be devised to divide the FEEP
between those two groups, for example, two-thirds for municipalities and one-third for provinces.
Again, there is no basis to propose a specific cut. The advantage of this approach is its
simplicity and ease of application. However, it may be politically too divisive, as there are
relatively poor, smaller cities that would be left out of the additional funds. Also, barangays may
strongly object when their entire group is left out of any additional financing.
A second approach is to devise transparent methodologies for estimating the differences
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (or fiscal gaps) of LGUs in each group. A couple
of such approaches are proposed in the next section. Obtaining a fiscal gap for each LGU
allows aggregation of all of the positive gaps (i.e., for those LGUs for which the estimates of
expenditure need to exceed the estimate of fiscal capacity) in each group. Thus, in theory, those
aggregate estimates could be used to redo the vertical distribution formula of the FEEP and
possibly of the IRA, sometime in the future.
However, at this stage, the estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are
conditional on the level of resources available to each group of LGUs as a whole. This means
that the estimates of fiscal gaps are not independent of the existing vertical distribution formula
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for the IRA. Nevertheless, this information could be helpful in deciding on the direction for the
desirable reform of the vertical distribution formula of the IRA, and therefore for its application to
the FEEP. In the future, using the methodologies introduced in this paper, it will be possible to
develop estimates of fiscal gaps that are independent of the IRA distribution formula. That will
require making normative decisions about standard expenditure needs, which are only at the
prerogative of the government.

IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMULA FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO QUALIFYING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
The horizontal distribution formula for the IRA uses a weighted index approach with three
variables: population, land area, and equal sharing. In the cases of provinces, cities, and
municipalities, the weights are 50% for population, 25% for land area, and 25% for equal
sharing. For the case of barangays, only two variables are used, population with a weight of
60% and equal sharing with a weight of 40%.
The overall intent of the IRA is to work as a general allocation transfer to address a large
vertical fiscal imbalance for LGUs regarding their expenditure obligations and autonomous
revenue sources.10 In this sense, the IRA appears to have performed satisfactorily, even when
there is not a good measure of expenditure needs by the different groups of LGUs and therefore
a good measure of vertical fiscal imbalance.
Most agree that the IRA has been defective in addressing horizontal imbalances in
expenditure needs and fiscal capacities, both across groups of LGUs and within each of these
groups. Across groups of LGUs, the vertical share allocation, as noted in the previous section,
does not take into account either aggregate expenditure needs nor aggregate fiscal capacity of
each group. Within each group, the IRA horizontal allocation formula only partially takes into
account the expenditure needs of each LGU within the group and completely ignores the fiscal
capacity issue. In particular, population and land area variables are likely able to capture
differences in expenditure needs but not all of the relevant differences. For example, different
population groups, such as the very young, elderly, or poor, imply different needs than the
regular adult population. There may also be differences in costs for the delivery of different
services because of geography (e.g., mountains or isolated islands), population density, or
proximity conditions.
In addition, the equal sharing is less likely to reflect expenditure need differences. The
use of this variable in the formula may be justified because of the fixed costs of operating an
LGU, given that smaller LGUs are unable to capture economies of scale in the operation of
services. However, this type of variable tends to benefit smaller LGUs in an exaggerated way,
especially when the weight attached to this variable is relatively large. At the same time, it tends
to provide a perverse incentive against jurisdictional consolidation if not a further incentive
toward further jurisdictional fragmentation.
Thus, the IRA has failed to equalize enough within and across each group of LGUs.
Even in the group that appears to be best off—cities—some units are struggling to meet their
demands for services (i.e., smaller and more geographically distant cities), while other LGUs
(i.e., large cities) seem to be much better off and have substantial reserves that overwhelm any
IRA allocations. Therefore, if the FEEP is to achieve greater equity, the current IRA horizontal
distribution formula cannot be used for the allocation of its additional funds.
To advance in the direction of a more equitable distribution of funds, two main
requirements must be met: (i) an improved measurement or approximation of the expenditure
10

The vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the difference in fiscal gaps (i.e., expenditure needs minus fiscal capacity)
between the central government and the aggregate of subnational governments. Usually the central government
has a negative fiscal gap (i.e., potential revenue exceeds expenditure need). Subnational governments have a
positive gap (i.e., expenditure needs exceeding their own revenue capacity). The vertical fiscal imbalance is thus
closed by using transfers from the central to subnational governments.
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needs of each LGU, and (ii) the incorporation of some measurement (or approximation) of the
fiscal capacity of each LGU.
The theory and best international practices in the design of equalization grants should
help define those two elements in the design of the horizontal distribution formula for the FEEP.
Before discussing approaches to measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity to compute
the fiscal gap for each LGU, a minimum first approach, which is basically a weighted index
approach, must be explored.

A.

Expanding the Weighted Index Formula in the Internal Revenue Allotment

Although this is the approach currently used for the IRA, the proposed approach includes an
additional variable for better approximating expenditure needs as well as one as a proxy for
fiscal capacity. However, this approach falls short of computing a fiscal gap for each LGU;
therefore, it only distributes the pool of available funds by formula. This distribution of funds will
be more equalizing, because it does take into account differences in fiscal capacity and
provides better bases to approximate expenditure needs. Although only one index formula
applicable to the three groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, and municipalities) is presented, a
separate index could be used for each group, because the factors included in the index try to
approximate the fundamentals behind expenditure needs for each group. Since the expenditure
responsibilities, and therefore the expenditure needs of each group, can differ, the factors
capturing those needs could also vary.
The extended index approach is as follows:11
AIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3(YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)
+ λ4(OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) + λ6(RFCi)
Actual FEEP transfer to LGU i = FEEPi = AIi x Total pool of funds available for the FEEP
transfer in each group of LGUs12
where,
AIi = allocation index (or participation share in the pool of funds, in percentage terms) for
jurisdiction i in the total pool available for transfers for each group
Popi/ΣPopi = share of population for jurisdiction i in the total population computed for
each group
Areai/ΣAreai = share of urban area for jurisdiction i in the total area for each group
YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi = share of population under age 5 years for jurisdiction i in the
total population computed for each group
OldPopi/ΣOldPopi = share of population over age 65 years for jurisdiction i in the total
population computed for each group
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi = share of population living in poverty for jurisdiction i in the total
population computed for each group
RFCi (Relative Fiscal Capacityi) = [Max FC – FCi]/Σ[Max FC – Average FC]
11

It should be clear that the contribution here is the proposition of an expanded index formula that is more
encompassing of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. At this stage, the actual additional factors included should
be treated more like an example of what can be done than a firm proposal of how a final index formula would look.
Other factors may be included as relevant and for which objective reliable data can be obtained. One set of factors
not captured in the index formula, but which may be quite relevant, are those measuring cost differences across
jurisdictions in the provision of public services.
12
As mentioned, barangays are not included in the discussion. However, if they were included, the expanded formula
here could be adapted to the information available for barangays, as is now the case in the IRA transfer.
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Where fiscal capacity is being measured as indicated in the next subsection of the
paper, and where
λ1 ……λ6 = relative weights for each of the factors in the formula
λ1+ λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, and
ΣAIi = 1
Two sets of decisions are important to make this approach operational: (i) the proper
values of the weights for each of the factors in the formula, and (ii) how to divide the pool of
available funds for the FEEP among the groups of LGUs. Unfortunately, there are no clear,
exact objective criteria for these choices.
The selection of the weight factors (e.g., λ1 and λ2) involves both technical and
inescapable political elements. Expert technical analysis within the Philippines from those who
intimately know LGU budgets must be used to gauge the relative importance of population and
land area in the determination of expenditure needs.13 Note that the factors approximating
expenditure needs are those from 1 to 5.14 In the same manner, technical expertise should be
used in assessing the impact of fiscal capacity in the relative position (truly, the fiscal gap) for
the different LGUs. This is approximated with a factor of 6. The stronger weight given to fiscal
capacity, the smaller the aggregate weight given to expenditure needs. This follows clearly from
the condition that λ1+ λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, and so that λ6 = 1 – (λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5).
For the purpose of the numerical simulations, the following values are assumed for the
weights, but these values are subject to revision and sensitivity analysis:
λ1 = 0.35
λ2 = 0.10
λ3 = 0.10
λ4 = 0.10
λ5 = 0.10
λ6 = 0.25
There is no clear way to divide the available FEEP funds among the different groups of
LGUs without computing fiscal gaps for LGUs. At this stage, there are several options that are
available: (i) use the same vertical apportionment as in the IRA; (ii) exclude the barangays, and
divide the available funds between the other three groups; or (iii) also exclude cities as a group,
and use the FEEP funds only for groups of LGUs that are widely acknowledged to be in the
most need. Of course, the consequences of selecting one vertical apportionment rule or another
are of much consequence. As an example, if the second rule is applied, 28.75% of the funds go
to the provinces, 28.75% go to the cities, and 42.50% go to the municipalities.
Using the most recent data available for 2008, the summary statistics for the FEEP
transfers to three groups of LGUs are shown in Table 2, where the adjusted weighted index
formula is used for the horizontal distribution within each group and the adjusted IRA vertical
distribution, as discussed above, to apportion the available funds between the three groups. For
the pool of FEEP funds to be distributed in 2008, P53,484.3 million was used for an IRA pool of

13
14

See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the potential rationale behind the weight factors.
Of course, other factors could be included, and even some could be excluded. Here, the authors’ best judgment is
used based on international practice and current data constraints. The variable measuring relative poverty,
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi, is taken here to approximate certain forms of expenditure needs. However, this variable could
also be taken to capture some elements of fiscal capacity, but this is not being done here. Fiscal capacity is being
measured independently through the RFC variable.
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funds of P213,937.2 million. An example of the necessary computations is shown in Appendix 4
for the case of some provinces.15

Table 2: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers
under the Adjusted Weighted Index Horizontal Distribution Formula and
Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment Vertical Distribution Rule
(P, simulated for 2008)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(P million)

Provinces
140.21
704.98
288.94
117.22
0.41
15,376.74

Cities
258.26
1,179.76
648.14
235.74
0.36
15,376. 74

Municipalities
219.75
19,507.67
540.07
579.02
1.07
22,730.83

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.

B.

Distributing the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund
on the Basis of Estimated Fiscal Gaps of Local Government Units

This is a different approach that represents a significant departure from the index approach
used in the IRA. This approach is based on the estimation for each LGU of a fiscal gap as the
difference between its expenditure needs arising from the current assignment of expenditure
responsibilities and its fiscal capacity based on own revenues and also all received transfers
and revenue sharing.
Fiscal Gapi = Expenditure Needsi – Fiscal Capacityi
Note that fiscal capacity measures all of the potential available resources to the LGU
other than the specific transfer, so it includes the own fiscal capacity coming from own taxes
and fees as well as any shared revenues and all transfers, including the IRA.
First, the expression for the fiscal gap needs to be estimated for each LGU in each of the
three groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, and municipalities). For every LGU within each
group that does not have a positive fiscal gap (FGi < 0), FGi = 0 is set. Then, an aggregate fiscal
gap for each group can be defined.
Σ Fiscal Gapi for provinces, cities, or municipalities)
Although an aggregate fiscal gap for each group is being estimated and they all are
measured in pesos, the aggregates for the groups are not necessarily comparable because the
processes used to estimate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are conditional on the
existing data and the averages for each group. Thus, there would be some LGUs in each group
with positive fiscal gaps, indicating a need for additional financing, when it may be possible that
in some normative absolute terms all or most LGUs in one group can be in better financial
15

Note that the maximum value for the municipalities is an outlier due to the current data for Kalayaan municipality,
which belongs to Palawan Province (Region IV-B). This municipality, which is a tourist destination, has a
population of 53 but relatively large revenues and expenditures.
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positions than all or most LGUs in another group. The methodologies discussed below can
provide the basis for those normative comparisons, but this paper will not introduce any
normative absolute standards for LGUs.
Nevertheless, the aggregate fiscal gap for each group of LGUs indicates the number of
LGUs in each group that appears to be in a deficit or positive fiscal gap situation. So, in
principle, those aggregate amounts can help inform changes in the apportionment of the
available funds in the FEEP across provinces, cities, and municipalities.
In addition, the aggregate fiscal gap for each LGU group can be used to distribute the
funds from the FEEP if a vertical distribution of these funds is accepted as used currently in the
IRA or other vertical apportionments discussed in the previous section. To see how this would
work, the two steps for each group of LGUs are:
(i)
Define the relative fiscal gap. The relative fiscal gap is the relative size of each
locality’s fiscal gap as a share of the aggregate fiscal gaps of all localities:
Relative Fiscal Gapi = Fiscal Gapi/ΣFiscal Gapj
(ii)
Assign equalization transfer. The equalization transfer to local governmenti is
defined as
FEEP Transfer to Localityi = Relative Fiscal Gapi* Part of FEEP Funds for the
Group of LGUs.16
Notice that different from the extended index approach discussed above, using the fiscal
gap approach does not produce a FEEP transfer for each LGU in the group. Instead, only those
LGUs with a positive fiscal gap are recipients of the FEEP. This has the advantage of being
more equalizing, since only those LGUs that cannot cover their expenditure needs with the
available resources would get the grant.
As an example, the vertical distribution rule for the FEEP is assumed the same as the
one used above to illustrate the extended index approach, so that 28.75% of the FEEP funds go
to provinces, 28.75% go to cities, and 42.50% go to municipalities. These simulations are
shown after the review and application of the methodologies to compute expenditure needs and
fiscal capacity.
In practice, there are a handful of methods that can be used to estimate expenditure
needs. Something similar holds for fiscal capacity. These methods used in international
practices are summarized in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

16

Instead of a proportional approach, a mini-max approach can be applied to the final allocation of transfers. With
this approach, LGUs in each group are sorted in ascending order by the size of their fiscal disparities. The idea is
to start from the bottom, allocating transfers first to those LGUs with the largest fiscal gap and then moving up the
ranks. The pool of available FEEP funds is eventually exhausted so that the last LGU receiving the grant funds
reports a fiscal gap exactly equal to all those below. Note that not all LGUs with a positive fiscal gap may receive
funds under this approach.
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C.

Approaches to Estimating Expenditure Needs

Below are two possible approaches to estimate the expenditure needs of LGUs.
1.

Estimation of Expenditure Needs Using per Client Expenditure Norms
(EN1)

The essence of this methodology is to determine, for each significant functional service
of an LGU, a financial standard or norm per client or user of the service (e.g., if LGUs were
responsible for elementary education, how many pesos per year would be allocated for each
elementary school student in the Philippines; this amount could be adjusted up or down with a
cost index for delivering this service).17 This is informed by practice but also a normative
budgeting approach in which the authorities establishing budget priorities determine how much
is desirable and affordable to spend on different services. As budget priorities change over time,
so would the per client expenditure norms for different services. The apparent problem is that no
one has stated what these financial per client norms should be for any service in the Philippines.
However, the actual executed budgets of last year contain all necessary data to compute the
implicit per client financial norms.
Following the same example, the implicit budget norm for elementary education can be
obtained as the total sum spent on elementary education by all LGUs divided by the total
number of elementary school children in the country. Note that the expenditure norm is common
to all LGUs in the absence of variations in cost provision.18 Once the methodology is established
using historical budget data, the budget norms can be changed in every budget period.
The concept of potential users or clients deserves special attention. Users or clients are
defined as all possible recipients of the services provided by a municipal government, which do
not necessarily correspond to the total population but could also represent a specific segment,
such as the elderly, students, or the population of a particular geographic area. Additionally, it is
important to distinguish between the potential users and those actually benefiting from the
services, since the last group might exclude eligible users due to, for instance, budgetary
limitations. Expenditure needs must be computed taking into account all eligible inhabitants (still
using the elementary education example, this means that the potential users include all children
of elementary school age, whether or not enrolled).
The practical steps are as follows.
Step 1: Determine the
government unit function. The
municipal expenditures in terms
responsibility of LGUs, as well as
each of these services.

17

expenditure aggregates or envelopes for each local
application of this methodology requires the classification of
of the functions or services that the law has defined as a
demographic information to identify the amount of users from

This determination of the per client expenditure norm can be done top-down and bottom-up. As discussed in
Appendix 2, a bottom-up methodology relies on the costing of the different elements of the service related to some
physical standards. This approach requires a lot of time and economic effort to put together, and it risks arriving at
per user or client standards that are essentially unaffordable.
18
This methodology and others that are used to estimate expenditure needs are budget preparation tools. In terms of
budget execution, the client-based expenditure norm may have a prescriptive character, forcing LGUs to spend
according to the established norm, or it may just be optional, in which case LGUs are allowed to decide a different
amount of expenditure per client. The international practice on this is varied.
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The methodology of expenditure norms by client requires establishing the total amount
of resources actually spent (and in future years, what the central government will determine) for
each local service or function. To make the procedure even simpler, it is possible to group those
functions with common users, or alternatively, to choose only the most important ones, while the
number of users for the remaining functions is assumed to be equal to the population. Using
historical expenditure data has the advantage of being feasible, because it is based on effective
expenditures incurred in the provision of local services in the country.19
The budget data for 2008 identify nine functional categories of local public expenditure:
(i) general public service; (ii) education, culture, and sports; (iii) health, nutrition, and population
control; (iv) labor and employment; (v) housing and community development; (vi) social security,
social services, and welfare; (vii) economic services; (viii) debt servicing; and (ix) other
purposes. The estimation of expenditure needs under the per client expenditure norms
methodology requires the calculation of the numbers of the clients for each of the above
categories of expenditures.
Local expenditure on general public services cannot be assigned to a particular
demographic group. Instead, as this function benefits the community as a whole, the total
population in the locality is defined as the client base for this service. For similar reasons,
economic services, debt servicing, and other expenditures are also spread among the whole
population of the locality.
In the case of education, culture, and sports, LGUs are generally responsible for the
provision of public school, which includes public kindergarten, primary schools, and high
schools. Therefore, the population between ages 4–17 years is defined as the number of
potential clients for education services. Regarding culture and sports, the users of these
services are assumed to be concentrated in the adult population before retirement, which
covers the range between ages 18–65 years. In sum, ages 4–65 years are the potential client
numbers for this expenditure category.
The benefits of local expenditure in the area of health, nutrition, and population control
are mainly limited to some specific groups, such as children and the elderly. However, services
are sometimes also provided to a more broad population. To capture this, a weighted population
is defined, with double weights for population under age 5 years and over age 65 years, with a
single weight for the rest of the population (ages 5–65 years), as the potential client numbers of
this expenditure category.
Services for labor and employment are oriented to the adult population before
retirement, so the number of potential clients is estimated as the population between ages 18
and 65 years.
The expenditure on housing and community development include services such as
water supply and sanitation, public lighting, natural gas infrastructure, and other communal
services. In general, most of these public services benefit entire families, especially poor
families, rather than a particular age or demographic group. Therefore, the number of poor

19

If the potential users are more than those historically benefited, the historical expenditure starting point could
become an unfeasible standard.
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households is used as an indicator of need, and the expenditure norm is developed for housing
and community development services on that basis.20
Social security, social services, and welfare is probably the expenditure function for
which the client base is more difficult to define. Services in this category are oriented to the
assistance of very specific groups, including the elderly, disabled, and children from troubled
social environments. Payments are sometimes also expensed to the unemployed and widows.
At this time, due to limited data availability, the different client groups cannot be accounted for
nor their intensity of the use of these services. Therefore, the elderly is assumed as the most
important group among the beneficiaries of social security, and the number of inhabitants over
age 65 years is used as the potential client base for these services.
It would be impractical and even misleading to try to define a per client norm for every
category of local expenditures. A large number of expenditure standards would reduce
transparency in the system and enhance the likelihood of complex discussions about proper
client bases. In general, under other expenditures, some functions are unimportant in budgetary
terms, as well as a varied combination of beneficiaries, so the local population is again the best
option to estimate the number of clients.
Step 2: Compute per client expenditure norm for each local function. Here, the
expenditure aggregate (at the national level covering all LGUs) for each function is divided by
the number of potential clients (also at the national level) of the services being delivered. This
needs to be done for each of the functional areas, covering the entire budget of LGUs.
Naturally, the difficulty of this step lies in the identification of potential clients for each service.
For example, for education, the client base is logically the school-age population. For health, a
client base can be built that overweighs the very young and elderly populations. For social
services for the poor, the client base is the population living in poverty. The entire population
can be used as the default client base for those functions that cannot be allocated to particular
groups. The criteria opted for in the estimation of the number of clients per expenditure
category, although well aligned with current international practice, are subject to improvements
and intended to serve as examples of how the per client expenditure norms should be designed.
In general, it is crucial to have well-defined expenditure responsibilities.21
Step 3: Compute expenditure needs for each function in each local government
unit. This can be obtained by multiplying the per client expenditure norm for each local function
by the client base for that function in the LGU.
Step 4: Compute the total expenditures needs for each local government unit. This
corresponds to the sum of the expenditure needs for each function in each LGU.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the summary of the selected expenditure categories with their
respective estimated number of clients, together with the respective per client expenditure norm.

20

Poverty data for provinces are available for 2009. However, these data are only available for 2003 for cities and
municipalities. In the simulation analysis, only the data available are used.
21
The standards per client can be easily adjusted upward or downward to the different costs of provisions of a
particular service by applying a relative cost index to the standard. At the present time, there are no reliable data
on cost differences for service delivery, and therefore no such adjustments are performed.
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Table 3: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Provinces
(P, 2008 values)
Expenditure Category
General public services
Education, culture, and
sports
Health, nutrition, and
population control
Labor and employment
Housing and community
development
Social security, social
services, and welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes

Aggregate
Expenditure Needs
20,953,886,720
2,315,550,208

Estimated Aggregate
Number of Clients
68,607,096
57,524,236

Per Client
Expenditure Norm
305.42
40.25

9,033,858,048

20,681,986

436.80

30,161,374
827,712,832

36,050,832
3,781,205

0.84
218.90

972,983,232

3,030,817

321.03

9,900,763,136
1,594,355,840
10,519,157,760

68,607,096
68,607,096
68,607,096

144.31
23.24
153.32

Table 4: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Cities
(P, 2008 values)
Expenditure Category
General public services
Education, culture, and
sports
Health, nutrition, and
population control
Labor and employment
Housing and community
development
Social security, social
services, and welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes

Aggregate
Expenditure Needs
39,109,013,504
9,308,789,760

Estimated Aggregate
Number of Clients
32,957,168
27,868,748

Per Client
Expenditure Norm
1,186.66
334.02

7,384,459,264

9,508,969

776.58

45,499,684
3,182,292,480

18,663,172
4,314,455

2.44
737.59

2,156,575,232

1,191,232

1,810.37

14,982,636,544
4,642,338,816
13,723,859,968

32,957,168
32,957,168
32,957,168

454.61
140.86
416.42
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Table 5: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Municipalities
(P, 2008 values)
Expenditure Category
General public services
Education, culture, and
sports
Health, nutrition, and
population control
Labor and employment
Housing and community
development
Social security, social
services, and welfare
Economic services
Debt servicing
Other purposes

Aggregate
Expenditure Needs
43,324,829,696
2,286,163,456

Estimated Aggregate
Number of Clients
55,436,636
46,164,100

Per Client
Expenditure Norm
781.52
49.52

6,438,859,776

16,678,747

386.05

69,520,528
983,428,864

28,752,384
18,695,866

2.42
52.60

2,517,392,896

2,469,623

1,019.34

10,452,777,984
1,476,958,336
15,960,967,168

55,436,636
55,436,636
55,436,636

188.55
26.64
287.91

In Appendix 5, a sample of the data generated is provided to arrive to the expenditure
needs of each LGU.
2.

Estimation of Expenditure Needs Using Weighted Indexes (EN2)

An alternative method for the estimation of expenditure needs is to use an adjusted
version of the weighted index developed in the previous section.22 For this purpose, first, it is
necessary to obtain an aggregate estimate of expenditure needs for all LGUs in each group.
These are called LENp, LENc, and LENm, representing, respectively, the aggregate
expenditure needs for the provinces (p), cities (c), and municipalities (m). For operational
purposes, those aggregate expenditure needs are assumed to be equal to the aggregate
executed expenditures in the last year in each group. These aggregates can be adjusted in
different forms. Historical expenditures of last year can be adjusted upward to the current year
by applying a growth index that may include the rate of inflation and real growth. Also, each of
the aggregates could be adjusted up or down depending on prior perceptions that some of the
aggregates may underrepresent needs (perhaps the case of municipalities and provinces) or
overrepresent needs (perhaps in the case of cities). In future years, the same approach could
be used, and the political factor can and should become more explicit in the setting and
reordering of expenditure priorities from the top down.
Second, it is necessary to adjust the index formula used above so that it includes only
those factors representing expenditure needs. As pointed out above, the index could be
different for the different groups, thus reflecting differences in expenditure needs. Here, an
adjusted index is used that excludes the fiscal capacity factor:
AAIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3(YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)
+ λ4(OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi)
This index has the same properties as above, and so they will not be repeated here.
Below are the steps involved in estimating expenditure needs with this approach.
22

However, recall that the index formula is used to distribute the available funds in the FEEP. Here, the index formula
is used differently, that is, to compute expenditure needs.
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Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of local expenditure needs (LENp, LENc,
LENm). These can be based on the most recent historical data, but these data can be adjusted
in different ways. In the computation, executed budget data for 2008 are used, and no
adjustments are made.
Step 2: Select expenditure needs factors. The expenditure needs factors selected can
differ among the groups of LGUs. Here, population, land area, youth population, elderly
population, and population living in poverty are used.
Step 3: Compute each local government unit’s relative need for each factor. The
share of population for each LGU in the entire population is Popi/ΣPopi (and so on).
Step 4: Determine the relative importance or weights of each needs factor. The
weights are assumed to be λ1 = 0.40, λ2 = 0.15, λ3 = 0.15, λ4 = 0.15, and λ5 = 0.15. Other sets of
weights could be assumed and be simulated.
Step 5: Calculate the expenditure need for locality i. This is
Needip = AAIip · LENp for provinces
Needic = AAIic · LENc for cities
Needim = AAIim · LENm for provinces
A summary of the computation is shown in Table 6, and an example of the data
computation to arrive at the results is shown in Appendix 6.
Table 6: Per Capita Expenditure Needs Using Weighted Index Formula
(P, descriptive statistics for 2008)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation

D.

Provinces
567.15
1,844.61
899.68
186.90
0.21

Cities
1,991.18
6,997.48
3,541.45
1,222.11
0.35

Municipalities
968.02
107,315.7
1,762.22
2,824.68
1.60

Approaches to Estimating Fiscal Capacity

Fiscal capacity has been defined as the potential revenue that an LGU can raise from its tax
base, exerting an average level of effort. To measure fiscal capacity, it is natural to focus on
those revenue sources over which LGUs have a certain degree of autonomy (i.e., the capacity
to modify either the base or the rates applied). These are usually referred to as own revenues.
Other revenues, such as shared taxes and transfers, provide LGUs with revenues, but since
they cannot be directly affected by LGUs, they can be accounted for directly by the amounts
actually received by LGUs for those concepts.
The adequate estimation of local fiscal capacity becomes important because of the
ability that LGUs have to affect actual tax collections. As the fiscal gap (and thus the FEEP
transfer actually received) is expected to be larger with lower fiscal capacity, there may be an
incentive for government officials to reduce tax effort from their own revenue sources (i.e., those
over which they can exert effective autonomy). In contrast, as remarked above, those other
revenue sources not subject to the influence of LGU actions, such as shared taxes or other
transfers, do not present any difficulty in this regard. For revenues outside of the control of
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LGUs, historical or actual revenues usually represent a good approximation to revenue
collection capacity.
The problem of estimating fiscal capacity is therefore reduced to the adequate
estimation of properly defined own revenues. Overall, fiscal capacity is thus defined as the sum
of estimated potential own revenues (EORi), and all other shared revenues and transfers
received (OT) other than the FEEP transfer. The fiscal capacity of an LGU i can then be
computed as
FCi = EORi + OTi
Unfortunately, there is usually a lack of data on tax bases, which limits the ability to
estimate own revenue capacity. Nevertheless, there is information on cadastral values for the
property taxes, which is used.
Regardless of the methodology used to estimate potential own revenues, overall per
capita fiscal capacity is obtained, as shown in the formula, by adding up the estimate of own
revenues to the actual shared revenue shares and all transfers (except for those received from
the FEEP).
In the following discussion, two methodologies are presented for estimating potential
own revenues (EORi).
1.

Estimation of Fiscal Capacity Using Average of Past Collection Ratios (FCi)

In the absence of detailed local data, the estimation of fiscal capacity can be based on
historical information available for local fiscal revenues. In general terms, this methodology can
be described by the following procedure.
Step 1: Select the revenue sources and time periods that help estimate the ability
of local government units to collect their own revenues (ORi), and for which complete
information is available. It is useful to use, for example, average data for the last 3 years. The
categories considered in the estimation should be those for which LGUs have some discretion
or ability to change the effort of collection. Thus, this category should include fully assigned
taxes to LGUs plus all user fees and charges.
Step 2: Compute revenues based on the local revenue source j, Fj, for each local
government unit i, and do the same at the national level for all local government units in
the same group. The following can be defined.
Fij = local revenues from j as the revenue from source j in each in LGU i and
FNj = total revenues in group from j
as the revenue in the set of all LGUs in the group from source j. It follows that total current own
revenues for LGU i is given by ΣjFij and for the entire group of LGUs by ΣjFNj.
The estimation of fiscal capacity should be based on potential revenues. As explained,
the use of historical or actual fiscal revenues might result in providing perverse incentives to
LGUs. A practical way of facing this problem is to consider an average of the relative (with
respect to the national level) per capita tax collections for a relatively longer period of time (e.g.,
3 years) as an indicator of local fiscal capacity. The idea is in using averages of several periods,
it will become more difficult for LGUs to alter the indicator of relative fiscal capacity.
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Step 3: Compute the index of relative fiscal capacity, IRFCi, for each group of local
government units. Provinces, cities, and municipalities can be defined as the historical
average (2008–2010) of ΣjFij/ΣjFNj representing the relation between the own revenue of local
unit i and the one for the entire group.
Step 4: Compute the fiscal capacity for each municipality i in each group. This
should be as FCi = IRFCi aggregate forecast of collections for the entire group, such that FCi
can be interpreted as the amount of collections that an LGU would have in the projected period.
For the purpose of the simulations, the aggregate own revenue collections for each group of the
last year available are used as a way to define the aggregate forecast of collections for the
entire group. Note that the aggregate forecast of collections for the entire group for future years
could be obtained by applying a growth index to the base year based on the inflation rate and
some estimate of real growth for the main tax bases.
Although, presently, implementation of this methodology is less than ideal, it may be a
good alternative to estimate potential own revenues and fiscal capacity of LGUs in the short
term. The data required in this approach are not difficult to generate, and the use of several
periods provides a simple, effective way to reduce the perverse incentive problem.
A sample of the data and procedures to estimate the capacity with the average of past
collection ratios is shown in Appendix 7 while the summary descriptive statistics are shown in
Table 7.
Table 7: Per Capita Fiscal Capacity Using Average of Past Collection Ratios
(P, descriptive statistics)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation

2.

Provinces
431.87
11,126.72
1,357.81
1,295.27
0.95

Cities
1,434.61
15,526.94
3,464.35
1,582.38
0.46

Municipalities
441.95
269,194.9
2,288.65
7,105.55
3.10

Estimation of Fiscal Capacity Using Basic Proxies (FC2)

Another methodology that can be used to calculate local fiscal capacity is to employ a
proxy that is highly correlated with an LGU’s capacity to collect revenues. Ideally, some
measure of gross local product or per capita income would be used, but lacking those data,
property value assessments are used here as a proxy for the entire own revenue capacity. This
is less than ideal because a good proxy requires that LGUs do not have any capacity to modify
the values that the proxy takes.
The logic behind using property value assessments is that (i) it is the variable available
that is close to some measure of tax bases; and (ii) that is not unreasonable to think that if
assessed values are high, other tax bases in LGUs are also likely to be high. That is, property
value assessments are highly correlated with other local tax bases. Unfortunately, only property
value assessments for provinces and cities are available. Therefore, this measure of fiscal
capacity, FC2, is only calculated for provinces and cities in this paper.
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The basic regressions of local own revenues on property value assessments are shown
in Table 8. The relative high values of the R-square indicate a good fit and high explanatory
power of the chosen proxy. The summary statistics for the estimated fiscal capacity are shown
in Table 9. Cities, on average and as expected, have higher per capita fiscal capacity, more
than double the per capita capacity of provinces. The variation in the estimates is larger in the
case of the provinces as measured by the coefficient of variation.
Table 8: Property Value Assessments as a Proxy Variable for Local Own Revenues
Province
Coefficients
t-Stat
4.69e+07
4.28
.007
13.73

Constant
Property tax
assessment
coefficient
R-square
F-statistic

0.71
188.38

City
Coefficients
1.50e+07
0.042

t-Stat
0.40
31.25

0.88
976.47

Municipality
Coefficients
t-Stat
…
…
…
…

…
…

…
…

… = data not available.
Source: Department of Finance and own calculations.

Table 9: Per Capita Fiscal Capacity Using Basic Proxies
(P, descriptive statistics for 2008)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation

Provinces
433.12
10,759.2
1,346.35
1,255.44
0.93

Cities
1,416.93
12,544.29
3,512.88
1,575.95
0.45

Municipalities
…
…
…
…
…

… = data not available.

E.

Coming Up with the Fiscal Gap for Local Government Units

From the combination of the alternative methodologies described above, four measurements of
fiscal gaps can be derived for the three groups of LGUs. Each measurement leads to a different
distribution of the FEEP across the LGUs. The four alternatives are presented in the following
table.
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Table 10: Alternative Measures of the Fiscal Gap

Expenditure needs
measurement

Per client expenditure
norms (EN1)
Weighted indexes
(EN2)

Fiscal Capacity Measurement
Average of past collection
Basic proxy
ratios (FC1)
(FC2)
Fiscal gap
Fiscal gap
measure 1
measure 2
Fiscal gap
Fiscal gap
measure 3
measure 4

Thus, for instance, fiscal gap measure 3 is based on the estimation of expenditure needs
according to the weighted indexes’ methodology (EN2) and the estimated value of local fiscal
capacity obtained by using the average of past collection ratios (FC1), such that the fiscal gap
be defined as:
FG3 = EN2 – FC1
Different measures of fiscal gaps can be obtained from different combinations, and a
discussion ensues as to which of the available alternatives make more sense to be used in the
distribution of the FEEP in the short to medium term. In Tables 11 to 13, descriptive statistics
are presented for the four alternative measures. To make them more comparable, they are
expressed in per capita terms.
No measure of fiscal gap is superior to another based only on these statistics, but it is
important to have a notion about the distribution of per capita fiscal gaps to evaluate and
compare the performance of the alternative methodologies. In truth, what matters is the quality
of the estimations of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The more accurate those
estimations are, then the more reliable the estimation of per capita fiscal disparities.
For Tables 11 to 13, it is important to note that the results from the four proposals are
mostly consistent in terms of the determination of LGUs with positive fiscal disparities (i.e.,
expenditure needs greater than fiscal capacities); perhaps the exception is for the case of cities.

Table 11: Fiscal Gaps for Provinces
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values)

Minimum
Maximum
Range (maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation
Average of positive fiscal disparities
Number of localities with positive fiscal
disparities
( ) = negative.

Fiscal Gap
Measure 1
(3,141.47)
375.06
3,516.53
(413.12)
668.93
106.15
21.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 2
(3,314.35)
373.81
3,688.16
(398.38)
669.26
111.51
19.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 3
(2,685.70)
359.97
3,045.67
(332.89)
556.39
126.22
16.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 4
(2,858.58)
358.72
3,217.30
(318.15)
557.41
109.86
20.00
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Table 12: Fiscal Gaps for Cities
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values)

Minimum
Maximum
Range (maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation
Average of positive fiscal disparities
Number of localities with positive fiscal
disparities

Fiscal Gap
Measure 1
(12,754.20)
1,394.33
14,148.59
(517.18)
1,599.82
467.71
55.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 2
(9,771.62)
1,477.18
11,248.80
(559.21)
1,577.06
488.73
54.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 3
(13,503.80)
2,986.23
16,490.09
86.41
1,943.91
988.12
90.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 4
(10,521.20)
2,940.93
13,462.14
27.18
1,871.69
956.84
85.00

( ) = negative.

Table 13: Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values)

Minimum
Maximum
Range (maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation
Average of positive fiscal disparities
Number of localities with positive fiscal
disparities

Fiscal Gap
Measure 1
(26,7796.60)
1,042.23
26,8838.8
(776.57)
7,146.20
205.23
467.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 2
…
…
…
…
…
…
…

Fiscal Gap
Measure 3
(16,1879.30)
1,176.10
16,3055.4
(530.03)
4,372.80
193.91
493.00

Fiscal Gap
Measure 4
…
…
…
…
…
…
…

( ) = negative, … = data not available.

As previously mentioned, one of the two most important goals of the FEEP is to reduce
the differences in fiscal disparities (or fiscal gaps) across LGUs. In practical terms, this requires
reducing, to a greater extent, the largest local fiscal disparities.
Any measurement of per capita fiscal gap provides a natural criterion for the assignment
of FEEP funds. Those LGUs with negative fiscal gaps (i.e., fiscal capacity exceeding their
expenditure needs) do not require, in principle, funds from the FEEP. At the same time, those
LGUs with larger (i.e., positive) fiscal gaps should receive greater per capita transfers than
others with smaller fiscal disparities. However, how big a per capital fiscal gap should be to
define an LGU as a beneficiary and how much more FEEP funds should be given to a relatively
needy jurisdiction are open questions.
Below, one of several alternative approaches is implemented to apportioning the
available FEEP funds among LGUs with positive fiscal disparities, known as the proportional
allocation mechanism. This approach apportions the available transfer funds among LGUs as a
fixed proportion of their positive fiscal disparities within each group of LGUs. No matter what the
size of the fiscal disparity, all LGUs with a positive fiscal gap will receive a transfer from the
FEEP, and the size of the transfer depends on the percentage of total positive disparities
represented by that LGU and, of course, on the size of the FEEP funds to be transferred.

26 | ADB SOUTHEAST ASIA WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 7

This point returns to the issue of the vertical distribution of the FEEP funds across the
different LGU groups. Here, two sets of assumptions are made for actually implementing the
FEEP distributions. In the first case, the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above is
repeated, assigning 28.75% of the available FEEP funds to provinces, 28.75% to cities, and
42.50% to municipalities.
In the second approach, the FEEP funds are apportioned proportionally to the total
positive fiscal gaps for each group of LGUs. To arrive at these proportions, the positive fiscal
gaps are added across the three groups of LGUs, and then the proportion for each is derived.
As discussed above, this approach is far from ideal, because the estimations of fiscal gaps is
conditional on the current systems of intergovernment finance, including the IRA. In the future, it
will be possible to arrive at measures of fiscal gaps that are based on normative statements of
expenditure needs of different LGUs, which will provide a better justification for the vertical
apportionment of the FEEP funds based on the proportional size of aggregate fiscal gaps for the
different groups of LGUs.
The results from implementing the proportional allocation mechanism for the FEEP
funds are below. To divide the available FEEP funds for the three groups of LGUs, the relative
fiscal gaps are computed for provinces, cities, and municipalities following the steps described
above. The results for the relative fiscal gaps, which, only apply to those LGUs with positive
fiscal gaps, are shown in Tables 14 to 16. Examples of the steps followed for these
computations are shown in Appendix 8.
Table 14: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Provinces
(descriptive statistics)

Minimum
Maximum
Range
(maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 1
0.0006
0.1683
0.1677

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 2
0.0015
0.1764
0.1749

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 3
0.0067
0.1782
0.1716

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 4
0.0027
0.1633
0.1605

0.0480
0.0430

0.0530
0.0450

0.0630
0.0430

0.0500
0.0390

Table15: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Cities
(descriptive statistics)

Minimum
Maximum
Range
(maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 1
0.0004
0.0542
0.0538

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 2
0.0002
0.0560
0.0558

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 3
0.0012
0.0336
0.0323

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 4
0.0001
0.0362
0.0360

0.0182
0.0143

0.0185
0.0128

0.0111
0.0070

0.0118
0.0076
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Table 16: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities
(descriptive statistics)

Minimum
Maximum
Range
(maximum–minimum)
Average
Standard deviation

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 1
6.27E-07
0.010875
0.010874

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 2
…
…
…

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 3
3.84E-06
0.012303
0.012299

Relative Fiscal
Gap Measure 4
…
…
…

0.002141
0.001568

…
…

0.002028
0.001541

…
…

… = data not available.

Table 17 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the allocation of FEEP transfers
assigned using the fiscal gap measure 1 (FG1), that is with per client expenditure norms for
measuring expenditure needs (EN1). It also uses the average of past collection ratios for
measuring fiscal capacity (FC1), also using the proportional allocation mechanism for the
apportionment of the funds as well as the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above
by assigning 28.75% of the available FEEP funds to provinces, 28.75% to cities, and 42.50% to
municipalities.

Table 17: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Transfers
under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment
Vertical Distribution Rule
(P, 2008)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(P million)

Provinces
0
2,031.23
126.42
326.42
2.58
15,376.74

Cities
0
4,445.48
576.52
1,016.61
1.76
15,376.74

Municipalities
0
9,068.76
315.71
669.30
2.12
22,730.83

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.

Next, alternative allocation of the FEEP transfers is performed by using the same set of
assumptions, except for the vertical distribution of the funds among provinces, cities, and
municipalities. The FEEP funds are apportioned proportionally to the total positive fiscal gaps for
each group of LGUs. First, the proportions or shares are computed, total, for positive fiscal gaps
across the three groups of LGUs. The allocation of FEEP transfers that would follow if this
vertical distribution rule was used is different from those in Table 17. As shown in Table 18, for
the summary statistics of this distribution, the clear winners, vis-à-vis the results in Table 17, are
the municipalities.
The horizontal distribution rule applied in both Tables 17 and 18 is an example of how
this allocation can be done. As noted, there are other possibilities for the horizontal allocation.
Improving on the horizontal allocation rule will be conditioned by the improvements of the
available data so that more sophisticated methodologies can be used to capture expenditure
needs and fiscal capacity.
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Table 18: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Transfers
under Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal Gap
Vertical Distribution Rule
(P, 2008)
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
Coefficient of variation
Total FEEP transfers
(P million)

Provinces
0
127.17
7.92
20.44
2.58
9,627.18

Cities
0
3,213.12
416.70
734.79
1.76
11,114.03

Municipalities
0
16,520.08
575.12
1,219.23
2.12
41,407.54

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.

On the other hand, there are no strong reasons supporting either modality of vertical
allocation of the FEEP funds among the three groups of LGUs used in Table 17 and Table 18.
Their advantage is that they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to some rule
that is arbitrarily derived. However, a strong vertical allocation rule could be derived, if the
normatively derived expenditure norms are used in the computation of expenditure needs for all
LGUs. This would also improve the horizontal distribution of the funds within each group of
LGUs, but this paper cannot make these adjustments.
To close this section, some of the dimensions of the equalization impact of distributing
the FEEP funds are examined using a fiscal gap approach. First, not all LGUs receive transfer
funds under this approach. As shown in Tables 11–13, only a share of provinces, cities, and
municipalities end up with a positive fiscal gap and are therefore entitled to receiving FEEP
funds. Based on the total numbers for the different groups of LGUs,23 the simulations show that
only 20%–27% of provinces receive FEEP funds, 40%–61% of cities, and 31%–33% of
municipalities.24

Table 19: Coefficient of Variation of the Per Capita Incomes Available
Before and After the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund

Before FEEP
After FEEP 1
After FEEP 2
After FEEP 3

Provinces
0.936
0.510
0.471
0.542

Cities
0.445
0.383
0.356
0.360

Municipalities
3.108
2.714
2.733
2.497

FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.
Note: FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution formula and the
adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional allocation and
adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional allocation and
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

23
24

The percentages that follow are based on totals of 78 provinces, 136 cities, and 1,492 municipalities.
Not all cities are wealthy, and the computed fiscal gap is still a relative concept based on historical data. Because
few cities are very rich, this is likely to pull a large number of other cities into having a positive fiscal gap. A lot of
these numbers could change in the future once absolute measures of expenditure needs are derived.
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Second, the impact of the FEEP distribution is equalizing as can be seen in Table 19 by
the significant reductions in the coefficient of variation for per capita income available before
and after the distribution of the FEEP within the provinces, cities, and municipalities.
Third, the amounts per capita distributed with the FEP are not at all trivial if they are
compared with the amounts per capita received from the IRA; actually, in many cases, they can
be much higher. Tables 20 to 22 show the per capita amounts received from the IRA and from
the FEEP for the 10 largest winners in per capita FEEP amounts for provinces, cities, and
municipalities.
Table 20: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and Fiscal Equity
and Expenditure Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from
the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund, Provinces
(based on fiscal gap 1)
Region
Region XII
Region III
Region III
Region V
Region I
Region IX
Region VI
Region IV-A
Region VII
Region VI

Province
Maguindanao
Nueva Ecija
Pampanga
Camarines Sur
Pangasinan
Sulu
Iloilo
Rizal
Bohol
Negros Occidental

IRA
412.634
491.088
473.961
590.530
492.485
633.692
577.965
432.889
671.935
593.041

FEEP 1
204.548
190.542
158.447
214.251
172.967
210.077
197.140
144.583
228.898
187.058

FEEP 2
2,031.225
941.812
784.321
843.024
482.037
1,305.255
513.449
363.529
556.333
279.647

FEEP 3
127.172
58.966
49.105
52.781
30.180
81.720
32.146
22.760
34.831
17.508

IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

Table 21: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and the Fiscal Equity
and Expenditure Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from
the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund, Cities
(based on fiscal gap 1)
Region
Region XII
Region III
Region XII
Region XII
Region IV-A
Region I
Region VII
Region V
Region III
Region IX

City
Cotabato City
San Jose del Monte City
Marawi City
General Santos City
Antipolo City
San Carlos City
Talisay City (Cebu)
Tabaco City
Malolos City
Zamboanga City

IRA
1,333.994
1,013.657
1,372.108
1,251.368
1,048.766
1,702.440
1,260.918
1,774.952
1,234.820
1,493.793

FEEP 1
543.052
366.653
544.568
396.923
332.166
609.463
471.279
645.854
439.594
440.437

FEEP 2
3,216.155
1,893.676
4,376.881
1,103.752
906.155
3,524.536
3,083.100
4,445.481
2,392.208
681.666

FEEP 3
2,324.581
1,368.716
3,163.533
797.773
654.953
2,547.473
2,228.411
3,213.116
1,729.046
492.697

IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.
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Table 22: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure
Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure
Performance Fund, Municipalities
(based on fiscal gap 1)
Region
Region IX
Region IX
Region XII
Region VII
Region IX
Region XII
Region XII
Region IX
Region XII
Region XII

Province
Tawi-Tawi
Basilan
Maguindanao
Cebu
Sulu
Lanao Del Sur
Maguindanao
Sulu
Maguindanao
Maguindanao

Municipality
Balimbing
Maluso
Datu Odin Sinsuat
Barili
Jolo
Piagapo
Matanog
Indanan
Parang
Talayan

IRA
439.561
745.383
654.487
745.354
747.425
850.203
848.958
860.292
731.079
870.496

FEEP 1
403.718
351.985
328.303
361.131
272.250
459.664
419.647
312.326
338.620
441.588

FEEP 2
4,894.385
3,496.870
1,533.682
2,604.800
1,116.778
4,373.018
4,149.793
1,712.173
1,383.433
5,355.485

FEEP 3
8,915.842
6,370.063
2,793.828
4,745.025
2,034.376
7,966.094
7,559.458
3,118.974
2,520.127
9,755.804

IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.

V.

PERFORMANCE-BASED EVALUATION OF RECIPIENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

A key element in the design of the FEEP is to ensure that the additional 10% funding will be
used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. There are two different
approaches that can aid in monitoring and improving the performance of LGUs. The first is a
traditional approach, using ex-ante controls and conditions on how LGUs can deploy the
additional funds. These include regulations on how the funds may be spent, what kind of inputs
can be used, and pre-approval of local decisions by higher authorities. However, the trend in
budgeting policy and practice worldwide has been toward de-emphasizing or abandoning this
approach.
The second option is to focus on the performance of LGUs by examining ex-post what
they have been able to achieve inquantifiable improvements in the quality and quantity of public
services. This new trend merges well with the emphasis at the national level on
performance-based budgeting and medium-term budgeting frameworks. However, there are
significant difficulties in implementing this approach. The measurement of the quality and
quantity of many public services can be challenging. Yet significant advances have been made
in this area, and therefore, despite the challenges, using ex-post performance-based evaluation
would be best to ensure the more efficient use of FEEP funds.
Although they are not uncommon, the experience worldwide with performance-based
grants is not yet significant. Bergvall et al. (2006) reviewed some European experience, and
Shah (2009) reviewed the experiences of other developed and developing countries. Some
performance-based grants in other countries are quite recent, such as Australia’s national
schools-specific purpose payments and the Race to the Top competitive grant program in the
United States. Among developing countries, Brazil has implemented performance-based grants
for education and health, while Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia have used them for a variety of
services, including roads, water, and even social insurance.
In general, there are different implementation paths that can be followed. Two important
objectives are to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs and to give them enough time to
adjust and improve their performance. This latter will be important because many of the
recipient LGUs are relatively poor with low administrative capacity.
This paper proposes providing LGUs a period of time (for example, 3 years)25 after
receiving the additional funds to show proof of improved performance in a number of carefully
selected indicators. In the case of unsatisfactory performance, a probationary period of 3 more
years with reduced funding from the FEEP of 50% would be granted. In the case of failure after
the probationary period, the FEEP allocation would be terminated for, say, 3 additional years.
After that, a new cycle could be started for qualifying LGUs under the FEEP horizontal
distribution rules. Of course, these are suggestive periods and rules and will be subject to
modification and improvements through a dialogue with stakeholders, especially of LGU
associations.
A challenge will lie in the selection of the performance indicators. The indicators at a
minimum should meet these characteristics or properties. They need to be measured
independently from the LGUs themselves; that is, they cannot be self-reported to avoid moral
25

The selection of the time period may not be a simple matter since the typical terms of local officials are 3 years, so
it is not clear that the right incentives would be in place.
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hazard problems. Ideally, the measurements should be provided by an independent agency,
which is accepted with respect and credibility by all stakeholders. The indicators also need to be
meaningful, that is, matter in a significant way for quality and quantity of public services and
ultimately for the quality of life of the residents in each LGU.
An additional challenge is that whatever indicators are selected, the different LGUs are
likely to start at different points in terms of those indicators. This means that if the indicator
levels are too low, many LGUs would just automatically qualify, which would produce no
inducement to increase performance. A potential solution to this dilemma may be to focus on
differentiated changes in those indicators as opposed to the levels of the indicators. However,
this choice will not be problem-free, because the relative difficulty of achieving advances in the
different indicators is not likely to be independent of the level of the indicator itself. This is an
area that will require ample discussion and consensus with stakeholders.
One first choice of performance criteria is whether they should concentrate exclusively
on the expenditure-service side of the budget or could also include criteria from the revenue
side of the budget. There are good arguments to include the revenue side, since many
observers of the decentralization process in the Philippines have highlighted the low level and
declining trend in own revenue collections by LGUs. A possible performance criterion could
involve certain percent increases in the collection of property taxes, or perhaps all own
revenues.
However, it is clear that the bulk of the performance criteria would come from the
expenditure-service side of the budget. An important decision will be whether to focus on the
outputs of services or on the outcomes. In general, the indicators should be service outputs, as
opposed to outcomes, given that the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for
service outcomes. For example, local jurisdictions can do more to ensure high rates of
vaccination or enrollment rates for children. They are less able to control the overall health of
children or their overall level of intellectual achievement since these outcomes depend on many
other variables, including the income and level of education of parents, which are outside the
control of LGUs.
Further, the property of “meaningfulness” could be met if the performance indicators are
to focus at least in part on the Millennium Development Goals in the areas of health, education,
and poverty reduction. Possible candidates for performance measurement could include the
percent change in infant mortality rate, percent change in enrollment rates, and percent change
in access to potable water. As simple as these indicators may look, there would still be
formidable difficulties in getting them implemented.
Fortunately, solid foundation work has been already done in the Philippines in the area
of LGU performance measurement, for example by Sosmeña, Guillermo, and Sappuay (2004)
and Guillermo (2008). The Department of the Interior and Local Governments has developed its
own Local Government Performance Measurement System, which also provides a good starting
point for the selection of the proper performance indicators.26

26

See also the background report from the Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance, Municipal
Development Fund Office (2008).

VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The design of the new transfer, the FEEP, for 10% additional funding as separate from the IRA
faces four major challenges: (i) how to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10%
additional funding, (ii) how to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of
LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays), (iii) what formula to use for the
distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs, and
(iv) how to ensure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service
delivery performance.
Regarding how to define the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding, two
basic options were explored, using the same base as for the IRA, which is internal revenue
collection, or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands the IRA base to
include all the collections also realized by the Bureau of Customs. The 10% equivalent increase
in funding is the same under both options. The only difference is how the two bases perform in
the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their volatility. Although there is some evidence that
the broader base exhibits a bit more volatility over time, the differences are not significant.
Therefore, there is not a clear preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to divide the additional
funding among the different groups of LGUs. One of the options considered was a modified IRA
apportionment by excluding the barangays from the vertical distribution. A second option used
the vertical distribution among provinces, cities, and municipalities being proportional to their
respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those fiscal gaps were estimated in this paper.
The advantage of either approach is that both offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as
opposed to a new rule that is again arbitrarily derived. Fundamentally, the only sound approach
to the derivation of the vertical distribution rule is to institute it in accordance with the true
expenditure needs of the different groups of LGUs. The expenditure needs derived in this paper
are based on recent budget data, and they do not necessarily coincide with what is considered
to be the true expenditure needs. That is, the expenditure needs derived in this paper reflect the
actual expenditures of different LGUs. If, for example, cities receive proportionally much more
funds than municipalities, the budgetary data and therefore the computed expenditure needs
will reflect higher expenditure needs for cities when this actually may not be the case. A strong
vertical allocation rule can be derived if normatively derived expenditure norms are used in the
computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. However, this paper could not make the
normative decisions necessary for the true expenditure needs.
The paper also addressed what formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds
for qualifying LGUs in each particular group. Here, there seems to be clear the consensus on
the need to improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions, based on a weighted
index of population, land area, and equal shares. In the paper, two alternative approaches were
developed. First the weighted index approach, now used in the IRA, was improved and
expanded by introducing additional factors to better proxy the difference in expenditures needs.
These factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. An
additional factor was also introduced accounting for the differences in fiscal capacity across
LGUs. The second approach consisted of the estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the
difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, for each LGU.
The paper then reviewed the different methodologies available for the estimation of
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, and it implemented with data for 2008 two measures for
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the estimation of expenditures needs and also two measures for the estimation of fiscal
capacity. The simulations of the FEEP transfers were carried out with the different
methodologies assuming two different vertical allocation rules across groups of LGUs. The first
is a modified IRA allocation rule (excluding barangays), and the second is in proportion to the
aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each group of LGUs. Using the fiscal gap approach allows
restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap. Under the
expanded weighted index approach, all LGUs receive FEEP transfers.
The last section of the paper addressed the issue of how to ensure that the additional
FEEP funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to
using ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposed using ex-post
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The
carefully selected performance indicators need to be measured independently from the LGUs
themselves and should be meaningful in a significant way in the quality of life of residents. The
indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to outcomes, given the local
jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. Because of very different
starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance need to be read as
differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the
set period would be followed by suspension of half of the available funding. After another round
or period of performance, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to
improve, or fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explored the past
experience in the Philippines with performance indicators and several possibilities that may be
available, the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work.

APPENDIX 1

BASIC RATIONALE AND MEASUREMENT OF WEIGHTS FOR
EXPENDITURE NEEDS FACTORS
There are two ways to approach the measurement of expenditure needs factors: the number of
clients and the cost of standard local service provision.
The number of clients can be used when the cost of the public service varies directly
with the number of users. In particular, when the per unit cost of the public service is the same
across jurisdictions and does not change with the number of users, a direct application of this
approach is the best option to estimate expenditure needs.
If an expenditure needs factor captures the number of consumers for a particular local
service, then the natural choice for the weight assigned to this factor is the percent of aggregate
local expenditures accounted for this particular service. For instance, if education is 43% of the
aggregate local budget, one may wish to assign the factor “school-aged children” a weight of
0.43 in the expenditure needs formula.
It is, however, common to observe differences in the costs of inputs across jurisdictions,
as well as changes in production costs as the number of local public services is increased,
especially due to economies of scale. In such cases, it is desirable to identify the factors
determining these cost differentials. These estimations can serve for developing a weighted
factor formula or for adjusting the per client cost of local service delivery. Unfortunately, no data
of cost difference are readily available in the Philippines.
Nevertheless, in those cases for which factors attempt to capture the costs of producing
local services rather than number of consumers, the assignment of weights requires a different
type of reasoning. In general, arriving at particular weight factors in an objective way is a difficult
task. One possibility is to take actual expenditures by local government unit in a base year as a
measure of its expenditure needs (i.e., the dependent variable), and then to run a regression on
those factors considered as relevant in determining cost differentials across jurisdictions.
To estimate an expenditure needs equation, the variables in the same scale must be
redefined (a standard normal transformation could be a good alternative), forcing the intercept
of the regression to zero. Once all variables are defined in an identical scale, the coefficients of
the regression provide a measure of the relative effect that, on average, each factor has on the
dependent variable. Of course, it is not guaranteed that the coefficients so obtained would add
up to 1; thus, a correction should be made to achieve this condition. Another possibility is to
estimate the equation imposing that linear restriction on the estimated coefficients. At any rate,
the estimated coefficient then represents the weights by which the factors should enter in the
index formula to approximate expenditure needs.

APPENDIX 2

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEASURING
EXPENDITURE NEEDS
The expenditure needs of a jurisdiction may be defined as the funding necessary to cover all
expenditure responsibilities assigned to the subnational government at a standard level of
service provision. In practice, there are several options to measure differences in expenditure
needs across subnational governments. In the following discussion, six methodologies are
described, which are presented in order of complexity from the simplest to the most complex.1

A.

Lagged Expenditure Values

An uncomplicated way to define the expenditure needs of a locality is relying on historical
expenditure patterns. Specifically, the available information on expenditure data of the last few
years, adjusted by inflation, could be assumed to represent the expenditures needs for each
jurisdiction. If local government units (LGUs) have discretion in deciding the amount spent
during a period, this method offers a reasonably realistic estimation of expenditure needs, with
important advantages like simplicity and minimum information requirements. Unfortunately,
under discretion, and particularly if LGUs have access to financial markets, the use of historical
data could also provide perverse incentives to the local authorities, because they will eventually
learn that increasing expenditures in the present will result in higher equalization transfers in the
future.
On the other hand, in the absence of discretion, the actual expenditures of past periods
could be determined by the particular financial constraints of the LGUs, which are imposed
either by the central government or by the inability to raise revenues locally. In such rather
common cases, the historical expenditure patterns reflect undesired differences in
revenue-raising ability instead of expenditure needs, and thus they should not be used to
estimate the expenditure needs.
To conclude, relying directly on lagged expenditure patterns is not a recommended way
to estimate expenditure needs under equalization transfer purposes.

B.

Equal per Capita Expenditure Norm

The simplest way to estimate per capita expenditure needs is by taking the average of historical
expenditures per capita at a national level. To compute this average, it is first necessary to
determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditure needs (SEN), which can be based on
adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast, and then to divide this amount by the national
population. This simple procedure is advantageous when there is no detailed information about
the differences in the per capita needs or cost of provision of local public services across
jurisdictions or when there are reasons to believe that those differences are negligible.
The per capita expenditure needs constitute a national norm in this case, and to
compute the expenditure needs for each LGU, it is only necessary to multiply this norm by the
local population:

1

See Gomez, Martínez-Vázquez, and Sepúlveda (2007) and Boex and Martínez-Vázquez (2007).
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EN i =

SEN
⋅ Pi
PN

Indeed, the local population is likely the most important variable in determining the total
expenditure needs and the cost of public service provision for an LGU, because it directly
provides an order of magnitude for the total amount of expenditures that must be incurred. Of
course, economies of scale, economies of agglomeration, demographic characteristics of the
population, geographical differences of jurisdictions, and other factors can substantially modify
the applicability of the national average for each jurisdiction. Thus, the national norm could
eventually be adjusted by one or more indexes containing information about differences in
relative needs or costs of provision. If the index is a good approximation to the relative needs
and costs of LGUs, this would clearly be an improvement. In any case, it is necessary to take
into account the higher complexity that comes with the gain in accuracy.

C.

Per Client (Top-Down) Financial Expenditure Norms

This methodology follows a similar structure than the equal per capita expenditure norm
methodology but improves the estimation of the expenditure needs by using more detailed
information about the expenditure functions assigned to the LGUs, and devising a local
government functional allocation in a top-down manner. Its procedure can be summarized as
follows.
Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditure needs (SEN) and
the aggregate level of expenditures needs per function j of subnational governments
(SENj). As mentioned previously, subnational expenditure needs can be based on adjusted
historical data or on the budget forecast. The same is true for functional expenditure needs,
which must refer to the expenditure responsibilities assigned by law to LGUs. Alternatively, the
functional budget forecast can incorporate adjustments responding to changes in expenditure
priorities, but in the overall the adjustments must balance to fit the subnational expenditure
needs.
Step 2: Compute the per client expenditure norm for each function j, dividing SENj
by the number of clients or users that the function j has at a national level, Cj. For
instance, if referring to the subnational expenditures in secondary education, then the number of
secondary students in the country becomes the number of clients, and the norm is obtained by
dividing SENj by this number.
It is clear that this method requires the existence of demographic data for all
jurisdictions, as well as a functional classification of expenditures that is not always available for
subnational governments. In this context, some gains in feasibility can be obtained by
simplifying the procedure, either considering only the most important subnational functions, or
by grouping the functions that have the same type of clients. For instance, if the administrative
costs cannot be assigned to specific functions, and there are also some rather unimportant
functions classified as other expenditures, then it will be convenient to add them up and divide
the result by the population, which in these particular cases represents a good proxy of the
number of clients.
Given a certain number of clients, once the funding envelope for any category has been
determined, then the per client norm has been implicitly defined. Accordingly, the amount of
money per capita or per client in the norm can be decided in an ad-hoc manner by line

38 | Appendix 2

ministries or even stated in the law for several years or changed every year. However, the
problem with this approach is that either the norms may not be affordable or may be too little;
thus, to ensure the feasibility of the norms, the best practice within this approach is to first
subdivide from the top (according to the expenditure priorities of the central authorities) the
available funding envelope for LGUs in all of the expenditure functions or categories, as
recommended in the first step.
Step 3: Compute the per capita equivalent need of all per client functional norms
(determined in step 2) for all jurisdictions. This step is necessary because the formula of
fiscal disparities is defined at a jurisdictional level and expressed in per capita units, and so all
of the elements to be incorporated must be defined in identical terms. The computation consists
of multiplying the per client functional norm defined at the national level (SENj/Cj) by the ratio
between the number of clients of that function in each locality and its population (Cji/Pi). The
reasoning involved is simple. If, for instance, in a certain jurisdiction with a population of nine
inhabitants, the number of clients of the function j is three (so the clients correspond to one-third
of the population), then a per client need of, for example $6 million, is perfectly equivalent to a
per capita need of $2 million (one-third of the per client need) within the jurisdiction.
Either in step 2 or 3, the per capita equivalent need of each category of expenditures
can be adjusted upward or downward to reflect differences in the costs of provision across
jurisdictions. Again, this must be done in such a way that the overall budget affordability of the
norm is not affected.
Step 4: Compute the per capita expenditure need of each jurisdiction j by adding
up its per capita equivalent needs for all categories. If considering three functional
categories of expenditures (j = 1, 2, or 3), once the SENj has been determined as in the first
step of the procedure, the three remaining steps can be summarized in the following
expression:

ENi =

SEN1
C1

C1i
Pi

+

SEN2
C2

C2 i
Pi

+

SEN3
C3

C3 i
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Due to several positive features, this methodology constitutes an attractive alternative for
the design of an intergovernment transfer system. Because of its structure, the per client
financial expenditure norm methodology is able to define feasible national norms that are also
flexible enough to be adjusted in response to changes in national public policy, to consider
differences in cost provision across jurisdictions, and also to adapt to limited available
information. Additionally, the estimation of expenditure needs is explicitly linked with the
functions of the subnational governments, which is the correct approach to measuring
expenditure needs. Finally, its simplicity contributes to the transparency of the system and the
predictability of the amount of transfers to be received by LGUs.
The main drawback of the methodology is its dependence on the selected expenditure
norms. A careful, rational determination of the national expenditure norms (or the available
funding envelope for each category) is, in this case, crucial for the success of the
intergovernment transfer system, because deviations from the actual expenditure needs can
importantly affect its equalizing effects. In this regard, the historical averages of per client
expenditures by function can provide a natural reference of magnitude, and each expenditure
norm can be adjusted upward or downward with caution, considering both the national priorities
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and the effects on the available funding envelope, such that the remaining functional norms are
underestimated or overestimated.

D.

Weighted Indexes of Expenditure Needs

This is, perhaps, the most commonly used approach for estimating expenditure needs.2 It
consists of creating a composite index of expenditure needs, which captures and weighs the
factors determining the cost differences in delivering a standard package of local government
services across jurisdictions. Such factors include demographic variables reflecting, for
example, the special needs of youth and the elderly, other factors such as the level of poverty
and unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. The list of criteria entering
the index and the weight used need to be carefully assessed and also thoroughly discussed
with all stakeholders to ensure that the main causes for substantial differences in the costs of
public service delivery across jurisdictions are captured in the index.
The methodology for computing the weighted index and the per capita expenditure
needs is conceptually simple, but it requires several steps that are better explained sequentially:
Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditures needs (SEN).
Step 2: Select the variables or factors explaining the cost differences in delivering
a standard package of local government services.
Step 3: Compute the indexes representing the relative expenditure need of each
and every jurisdiction, for each and every selected variable.
n

ri k = Fi k /

∑F

i

k

,

i =1

where Fi k is the value of the variable k for the jurisdiction i, n the number of jurisdictions, and
k
thus ri is the index of relative expenditure need of jurisdiction i according to the values of the
variable k.
Step 4: Establish the weights or the relative importance of the selected factors in
the determination of expenditure needs, a k , which are identical for all jurisdictions. This
is as follows.
m

∑a

k

= 1,

k =1

where m is the number of factors.
Step 5: Compute the composite index of expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i
(IENi).
2

This approach is implicitly applied when a weighted-factor mechanism is used for allocating equalization grants. In
this case, however, its use is restricted to estimating expenditure needs, while in practice the weighted-factor
formulas are usually not transparent in separating expenditure needs from fiscal capacity.
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m
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Step 6: Compute the expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i.

ENi = IENi ⋅ SEN

The effectiveness of this methodology in estimating expenditure needs depends on the
choice of the factors and their weights. Objective choices of factors and weights capturing the
variation in expenditure needs can be made by using simple statistical techniques. The factors
are those explaining the differences in expenditure needs, and the weights represent the
relative contribution of each factor to the overall measure of need. In practice, however, the data
required to objectively select the factors and estimate their proper weights are not always
available, and these decisions, subject to political pressure, are made in an arbitrary and
obscure manner.
LGU officials and parliamentarians have incentives to fight for the inclusion of those
factors that favor their own constituencies, or for weighting them more heavily. So, if the
analysis is not based on objective information, the political process can easily result in a formula
that does not estimate expenditures needs properly. A tendency also exists for policy makers to
overdesign the measure of expenditure needs by including too many factors, adding complexity
and reducing transparency in the allocation scheme. In reality, the inclusion of more factors
does not necessarily represent a gain in accuracy, because they are usually correlated and thus
no new information is effectively added.
Therefore, a balance has to be struck between simplicity and transparency, and it is
necessary to find factors that equitably reflect the true fiscal need of LGUs. Variables used as
factors should more accurately reflect needs, come from an independent source, and be free of
manipulation by either central or subnational governments.

E.

Traditional (Bottom-up) Physical Expenditure Norms

Expenditure needs can also be measured in a bottom-up manner, by exhaustively costing a
standardized basket of LGU services. In addition to the determination of standard levels of
public services (national averages or minimum requirements), this approach requires a detailed
quantification of the inputs, information about their cost or prices, a description of the production
process for all local public goods and services, and explicit procedures for how to cost all
aspects of the expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments. The expenditure needs
for each LGU are obtained by simply adding up all the costs of delivering the targeted standards
associated with the subnational services within the jurisdiction.
Although appealing, the traditional approach is usually unrealistic due to the impossibility
of gathering all of the information it requires. Collecting and managing all the information could
be very demanding in terms of effort and extremely expensive. Finally, this approach may also
be impractical because it can lead to unaffordable estimations of expenditure needs, forcing
adjustment downwards of the computed expenditure needs.
These important drawbacks explain why the international practice has consistently
moved toward alternative approaches in expenditure needs estimation during the last
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decades.3 In particular, the top-down approach already explained can be regarded as the most
adequate and suitable whenever the information available at the subnational level is limited,
while other statistically based approaches can provide ideal estimations of local expenditure
needs when the data are detailed and abundant enough to do so. One example of the latter
approach is the representative expenditure system, methodology that will be explained in the
following point.

F.

Regression-Based Representative Expenditure System

Among the methodologies presented here for measuring expenditure needs, this is the most
sophisticated and complex. It is data-intensive, and thus not suitable to be applied in all
countries, but it offers a very good estimation of expenditure needs.
Step 1: Select, among the expenditures responsibilities of subnational
governments, those functions or categories that are subject to equalization.
Step 2: Identify the main factors, other than the prices of inputs, determining the
cost of providing local services for each of the selected functions. This can be done
through a regression analyses in which the explained or dependent variables are the actual
expenditures incurred in each function. The explanatory or independent variables are those that
explain the differences in the cost of providing public services across jurisdictions. The relevant
factors are those that are statistically significant and have a relevant impact in the costs of
public service provision.
Step 3: Compute the per capita representative expenditures for each function and
each locality by using the coefficients obtained in step 2. The representative expenditures
can be interpreted as the amount of money that an LGU would have spent in some category if it
had provided the standard level of service.
Step 4: Adjust the per capita representative expenditures by considering the input
prices.
Step 5: Add the adjusted per capita representative expenditures of all categories
to arrive at the total per capita representative expenditures.

The representative revenue system is technically considered the best approach to
estimate expenditure needs, so it can be recommended whenever its application is feasible.
However, the procedure is data-intensive, and it is usually not possible, or too expensive, to
collect all of the detailed information required for the proper use of this model.

3

Only a few countries, most of them developed, have the capacity to deal with highly detailed expenditure norms.
Examples of countries currently using this bottom-up approach are Denmark, Japan, and the Netherlands.

APPENDIX 3

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEASURING FISCAL CAPACITY1
The fiscal capacity of a subnational government may be defined as the potential revenues that
can be obtained from the tax bases assigned to the subnational government if an average level
of effort (by national standards) is applied to those tax bases. Thus, ideally, the measure of
fiscal capacity should consider either the size of the tax bases available to subnational
governments or the revenue that these tax bases yield under standard tax rates.
A variety of methods are used around the world to measure local government fiscal
capacity, four of which are presented here.

A.

Lagged Own Revenue Collections

The lagged or historical level of revenue collections constitutes a simple way to define the fiscal
capacity of jurisdictions. Unfortunately, using past collections does not satisfactorily address the
problem of negative incentives, because subnational governments can discern that higher
collections translate into lower transfers and consequently reduce their tax effort to take
advantage of the transfer system.
Another problem with this approach is the existence of a difference or gap (sometimes
large) between actual and potential collections in any jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the
size of these gaps also varies across jurisdictions. There are several causes for these gaps to
arise. One cause could be differences in the tax structure or in the definition of the tax base
across jurisdictions. For instance, they could compute the taxable income in a different way or
have dissimilar criteria for tax exemptions. In both cases, tax collection likely differs between
similar jurisdictions, even if their fiscal capacity is identical. Similarly, tax avoidance and tax
evasion might affect some local governments more than others, and the ability to overcome
these problems, including the costs that must be assumed to improve the compliance rates,
may also vary across jurisdictions.
In general, using the actual amount of revenue collections in a jurisdiction as a measure
of fiscal capacity should be avoided if local authorities can control tax rates, the tax base, or
administrative enforcement effort. In such a case, some local governments would be able to
reduce the actual collections (in exchange, for example, of political benefits) and benefit in an
undesirable way from the equalization transfer system. This kind of practices could seriously
damage the equalizing effects of the program.
Due to these complications, and the similar shortcomings presented by the lagged
expenditure values in estimating expenditure needs, the direct application of historical data in
estimating the fiscal disparities should, in general, be avoided. As an alternative, the same as in
the case of expenditure needs estimation, simple manipulation of the available historical data
can serve to reduce the problems related to perverse incentives and the differences between
actual collections and true fiscal capacity. The following methodology is an example of this
strategy.

______________________________
1

See again Gomez, Martínez-Vázquez, and Sepúlveda (2007) and Boex and Martínez-Vázquez (2007).
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B.

Average of Past Collection Ratios

To reduce the problems related to the use of lagged own revenue collections in estimating fiscal
capacity, some slight manipulations of historical collection can provide effective and
straightforward solutions.
The present methodology consists of computing the ratio between local per capita
revenues and the per capita revenues at the national level for several years, and then obtaining
an average of these ratios for each jurisdiction, which indicates the relative size of local per
capita collections with respect to the national standard in a period of several years. Thus, a
single estimator of relative fiscal capacity is obtained for each jurisdiction and considers only
historical collection data. There are important potential advantages in using historical data in this
indirect way. The complete procedure can be summarized in the following six steps.
Step 1: Select, among all sources of revenues, those that can be used to represent
the fiscal capacity of local governments. If fiscal capacity is understood as the revenues that
a local government unit (LGU) raises by applying standard tax rates to their tax bases, then it is
natural to consider the own taxes applied by the LGU within its jurisdiction as the most important
source of revenue. However, since what matters is to measure the ability of an LGU to cover its
expenditure needs, it is also necessary to include those received as revenue sharing from the
central government and all intergovernment transfers exempting only equalization transfers.
Again, to avoid undesirable manipulation, it is appropriate that no discretion is allowed by
central or local government officials in the determination of the tax rates or the composition of
the tax base on these sources of revenue.
Step 2: Define the historical periods that can serve better as a reference for
estimating future fiscal capacity. The more periods considered, the lower the possibility of
undesirable manipulation of the index created for estimating future fiscal capacity. However, the
use of very old collection data can be misleading if many changes have taken place in the
collection patterns of LGUs during the last years. For these reasons, periods of 3, 4, or 5 years,
depending on data availability and current relevancy of the information, could be a plausible
choice.
Step 3: Compute the per capita revenue for each jurisdiction i and for each period
t (Rjt), as well as the per capita revenue at a national level for every year (RNt). Defining Pit
and PNt as the population in jurisdiction i and the national population in period t, then the per
capita revenues for each revenue source j, jurisdiction i and period t are defined as
Ri j t =

revenues for i , from source j t
total revenues, source j t
, and RN j t =
.
Pi t
PN t

Furthermore, the total per capita revenues at jurisdictional and national level in each
period are given by Ri t = j Ri j t and RN t = j RN j t , respectively.

∑

∑

Step 4: Compute the relative collection ratios, for every jurisdiction i and period t
(RCRit), which are obtained for every year by dividing the per capita revenues of
jurisdiction i by the national per capita revenues: RCR it = R i t R N t . The relative collection

ratios can be lower, equal, or higher than 1, meaning that the jurisdiction have collected less,
the same, or more per capita revenues than the country as a whole during a certain year.
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Step 5: Compute the index of relative collection for each jurisdiction (IRCi), as the
average of all relative collection ratios of the jurisdiction. Defining T as the number of
periods selected for the estimation, then IRCi = t RCRi t T . The index of relative collection

∑

has exactly the same interpretation than the relative collection ratios, but it refers to a longer
period of time. This last characteristic helps moderate the perverse incentives associated with
the benefits of reducing tax collections, because now, if an LGU wants to increase the amount
of future transfers, it must modify a multiyear average instead of a single-year result. Indeed, the
expected benefits of reducing the local tax collections are decreased in proportion to the
number of periods used in the computation of the average, so the perverse incentives are
directly reduced as well. Additionally, if the local government officials are not sure whether they
will remain in their positions during the following years, then the idea of beneficiating competing
political parties in the future can also discourage that behavior. If present, this “democratic
factor” could eventually increase the effectiveness of this methodology.
Step 6: Estimate the per capita fiscal capacity for all jurisdictions as

FCi = IRCi ⋅ Aggregate Revenue Forecast

This estimation of fiscal capacity can be interpreted as the fiscal capacity that the LGU i
would have in the forecasted period if the average tax collection at the local and national level
remains unchanged and the macroeconomic expectations are fulfilled.

C.

Basic Proxies for the Local Ability to Tax

A different approach to estimating the fiscal capacity of subnational governments is by
considering proxies or variables that in theory should be highly correlated with their ability to
collect revenues. A widely used variable is the per capita level of personal income, which tends
to be a good proxy and is usually available. Another commonly used variable is the gross
regional product (GRP), which is the subnational equivalent of gross domestic product and can
also serve as a proxy of fiscal capacity. GRP is actually a more comprehensive measure of
fiscal capacity than per capita income, because it includes all the income generated within a
region, personal and corporate, irrespective of the location of residence of the worker or
producer.
To improve the estimation of fiscal capacity, it is also possible to exclude from the GRP
certain items such as central taxes and transfers, which are not part of the potential tax base.
The resulting modified version of the GRP is referred as total taxable resources, and it
constitutes a good estimator of fiscal capacity.

D.

Representative Revenue System

The basic idea underlying the representative revenue system is to calculate the amount of
revenue that a region would collect if it is to exert average fiscal effort. This is done by collecting
data on revenue collections and tax bases for each tax under consideration and for every
subnational region. Based upon information on all tax bases for every region as well as the
national average fiscal effort for each of the taxes, one can compute the amount of revenues
that each jurisdiction would collect under average fiscal effort. This amount is then considered to
quantify the fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction.
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The representative revenue system is a thorough, complete method to measure the
fiscal capacity of a region. It is based on disaggregated data and detailed knowledge of the
statutory tax bases, taking into account variations in effective tax rates among various tax
components and nontax revenue sources. As a result, fiscal capacity as measured by the
system can be considered as an accurate representation of a region’s true fiscal capacity.
However, due to the disaggregated nature of the information, the measure is data-intensive and
is not always possible to use.

APPENDIX 4

Ilocos Norte

Ilocos Sur

La Union

Pangasinan

Abra

Apayao

Benguet

Ifugao

Kalinga

Mt. Province

Region

Region I

Region I

Region I

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

148,661

182,326

180,815

372,533

103,633

230,953

2.65E+06

720,972

633,138

2,157.38

3,231.25

2,628.21

2,769.08

4,351.23

4,198.20

5,451.01

1,503.75

2,595.96

3,504.30

Population 2008

547,284

(2)

Young Population
18,489

22,948

21,008

41,508

12,865

26,739

307,465

75,822

65,759

54,789

(3)

Elderly Population
9,467

8,092

8,012

14,639

4,663

15,529

138,257

42,327

45,106

39,055

(4)

Poverty Population
10,280

7,314

7,716

5,992

8,463

15,182

114,400

35,618

17,238

11,923

(5)

a

Fiscal Capacity
2,325.84

2,066.59

2,195.43

1,909.24

3,853.51

2,438.18

632.97

818.88

989.65

1,178.15

(6)

0.0022

0.0027

0.0026

0.0054

0.0015

0.0034

0.0386

0.0105

0.0092

0.0080

Proportion of
(7) = (1)/sum(1) Population

CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund.
a
Fiscal capacity is computed by the average of past collection ratios method (FC1).
b
(12) = [max(12)–(12)]/{N*[max(12)–average(12)]}, where N is the number of provinces.
c
(13) = 0.35*(7)+0.1*(8) +0.1*(9)+ 0.1*(10) +0.1*(11) +0.25*(12)
d
(14) = [(13)*total available FEEP for provinces]/(1)

Province

Region I

Land Area 2008

(1)

Proportion of Land
(8) = (2)/sum(2) Area
0.0066

0.0099

0.0081

0.0085

0.0134

0.0129

0.0167

0.0046

0.0080

0.0108

Proportion of Young
(9) = (3)/sum(3) Population
0.0022

0.0027

0.0025

0.0049

0.0015

0.0032

0.0364

0.0090

0.0078

0.0065

Proportion of Elderly
(10) = (4)/sum(4) Population
0.0031

0.0027

0.0026

0.0048

0.0015

0.0051

0.0456

0.0140

0.0149

0.0129

Proportion of Poverty
(11) = (5)/sum(5) Population
0.0027

0.0019

0.0020

0.0016

0.0022

0.0040

0.0303

0.0094

0.0046

0.0032

0.0113

0.0116

0.0114

0.0118

0.0093

0.0111

0.0134

0.0132

0.0130

0.0127

b

Relative Fiscal
Capacity
(12)

0.0050

0.0056

0.0053

0.0068

0.0047

0.0065

0.0298

0.0107

0.0100

0.0093

c

(13)

Weighted Index
(%)

COMPUTATION OF PER CAPITA FISCAL EQUITY AND EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE
FUND TRANSFERS BY ADJUSTED WEIGHTED INDEX FORMULA IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE
ALLOTMENT FOR PROVINCES
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521.29

468.36

451.08

282.04

700.67

431.31

172.97

227.66

242.71

261.41

d

(14)

FEEP Transfer per
Capita
(P)

Total Population: General Public Service,
Economic Services, Debt Servicing, Other
Purposes

Province

Ilocos Sur

La Union

Pangasinan

Abra

Apayao

Benguet

Ifugao

Kalinga

Mt. Province

Region I

Region I

Region I

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

148,661

182,326

180,815

372,533

103,633

230,953

2.60E+06

720,972

633,138

547,284

(2)

120,283

151,058

151,577

314,799

86,037

188,026

2,196,819

601,508

520,984

452,289

CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Ilocos Norte

Region I

(1)

Population between Age 4–65 Years:
Education, Culture, and Sports

(3)

46,421

55,044

53,531

107,877

31,230

71,420

795,941

214,821

192,889

165,533

(4)

73,366

92,441

94,155

206,660

54,473

121,812

1,395,381

400,487

350,452

310,260

(5)

10,280

7,314

7,716

5,992

8,463

15,182

114,400

35,618

17,238

11,923

(6)

9,467

8,092

8,012

14,639

4,663

15,529

138,257

42,327

45,106

39,055

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.42

305.4

Weighted Population: Health, Nutrition, and
Population Control

Expenditure norm

Population between Age 18–65 Years:
Labor and Employment

686,071

Poverty Population: Housing and
Community Development

20,953.9

Population over Age 65 Years: Social
Security and Welfare

Aggregate clients

2,315.6

Education, Culture, and Sports
32.57

33.35

33.74

34.02

33.42

32.77

33.43

33.58

33.12

33.27

40.3

575,242.4

9,033.9

Health, Nutrition, and Population Control

30.2

Labor and Employment
0.8

360,508.3

827.7

218.9

37,812.1

973

321.0

30,308.2

144.3

686,071

9,900.8

Economic Services

136.40

131.87

129.32

126.49

131.63

135.08

131.42

130.15

133.07

132.12

0.41

0.42

0.44

0.46

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.46

0.46

0.47

15.14

8.78

9.34

3.52

17.88

14.39

9.47

10.81

5.96

4.77

20.44

14.25

14.22

12.62

14.44

21.59

16.78

18.85

22.87

22.91

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

144.31

(7)…(15)=expenditure norm * number of clients/total population

436.8

206,819.9

Housing and Community Development

Equivalent per Capita Need

Social Security, Social Services, and
Welfare

Number of Clients

1,594.4

Debt Servicing
23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.24

23.2

686,071

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.32

153.3

686,071

10,519.2

Other Purposes

COMPUTATION OF PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE NEEDS BY EXPENDITURE NORMS (EN1)
FOR PROVINCES

APPENDIX 5

General Public Services

Aggregate expenditure (million)

Region

Appendix 4
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831.25

814.96

813.36

803.40

824.10

830.56

817.83

820.15

821.78

819.83

(7)++…+(15) EN1

Appendix 5

APPENDIX 6

Province

547,284
633,138
720,972
2.60E+06
230,953
103,633
372,533
180,815
182,326
148,661

3,504.3
2,595.96
1,503.75
5,451.01
4,198.2
4,351.23
2,769.08
2,628.21
3,231.25
2,157.38

Population 2008

(3)

Young
Population
54,789
65,759
75,822
307,465
26,739
12,865
41,508
21,008
22,948
18,489

CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a
(11)=0.4*(6)+0.15*(7) +0.15*(8)+ 0.15*(9) +0.15*(10)
b
(12)=[(11)* aggregate expenditure needs for provinces]/(1)

Ilocos Norte
Ilocos Sur
La Union
Pangasinan
Abra
Apayao
Benguet
Ifugao
Kalinga
Mt. Province

(2)

Old Population
39,055
45,106
42,327
138,257
15,529
4,663
14,639
8,012
8,092
9,467

(4)

Poverty
Population
11,923
17,238
35,618
114,400
15,182
8,463
5,992
7,716
7,314
10,280

(5)

Proportion of
Population
(6) = (1)/sum(1)
0.0108
0.0080
0.0046
0.0167
0.0129
0.0134
0.0085
0.0081
0.0099
0.0066

Proportion of
Land Area
(7) = (2)/sum(2)

0.0080
0.0092
0.0105
0.0386
0.0034
0.0015
0.0054
0.0026
0.0027
0.0022

Proportion of
(8) = (3)/sum(3) Young
Population
0.0065
0.0078
0.0090
0.0364
0.0032
0.0015
0.0049
0.0025
0.0027
0.0022

Proportion of
Old Population
0.0129
0.0149
0.0140
0.0456
0.0051
0.0015
0.0048
0.0026
0.0027
0.0031

(9) = (4)/sum(4)

Region

Region I
Region I
Region I
Region I
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR

Land Area 2008

(1)

Proportion of
(10) = (5)/sum(5) Poverty
Population
0.0032
0.0046
0.0094
0.0303
0.0040
0.0022
0.0016
0.0020
0.0019
0.0027

839.77
795.71
759.45
738.21
1,246.52
1,844.61
775.90
1,037.59
1,124.21
1,157.96

(11)a

0.0082
0.0090
0.0098
0.0348
0.0051
0.0034
0.0051
0.0033
0.0037
0.0031

(12)b

Weighted Index
(%)

COMPUTATION OF PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE NEEDS BY WEIGHTED INDEX FORMULA (EN2)
FOR PROVINCES
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EN2

Ilocos Norte
Ilocos Sur
La Union
Pangasinan
Abra
Apayao
Benguet
Ifugao
Kalinga
Mt. Province

Region I
Region I
Region I
Region I
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR

108,695,952.00
41,236,792.00
61,154,420.00
277,683,264.00
27,399,410.00
2,356,469.25
171,195,008.00
46,683,580.00
17,097,756.00
26,786,104.00

(2)

(1)

77,356,752.0
20,831,182.0
61,574,848.0
196,064,336.0
23,107,566.0
2,268,535.5
147,329,360.0
16,102,927.0
15,263,204.0
23,072,496.0

2007

2006

92,351,480.0
53,646,624.0
70,983,048.0
227,151,808.0
26,263,748.0
5,290,131.5
205,977,840.0
87,096,672.0
17,325,910.0
31,963,782.0

(3)

2008

547,284
633,138
720,972
2,645,395
230,953
103,633
372,533
180,815
182,326
148,661

(4)

Total
Population

0.0107
0.0043
0.0074
0.0269
0.0030
0.0004
0.0200
0.0055
0.0019
0.0031

(5) = [(1)/sum(1)+
(2)/sum(2)+(3)/
sum(3)]/3

Relative Fiscal
Capacity
(3-year average)

1.05E+08
42,399,980
73,129,216
2.65E+08
29,004,076
3,625,051
1.96E+08
53,592,896
18,771,798
30,656,818

(6) = (5)* aggregate
forecast of
total collection

Estimated Own
Revenues

539,783,808
584,188,032
517,261,952
1,409,807,616
534,100,864
395,726,048
514,814,784
343,372,960
358,020,480
315,104,256

(7)

Other
Revenuesa

CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a
Other revenues include share from national tax collection, extraordinary receipt aid, loans and borrowing, and interlocal transfers in fiscal year of 2008.

Province

Region

Own Revenues
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1,178.15
989.65
818.88
632.97
2,438.18
3,853.51
1,909.24
2,195.43
2,066.59
2,325.84

[(6)+(7)]/(4)

FC1

COMPUTATION OF PER CAPITA FISCAL CAPACITY ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE OF PAST
COLLECTION RATIOS (FC1) FOR PROVINCES

APPENDIX 7

Appendix 6

APPENDIX 8

Ilocos Norte
Ilocos Sur
La Union
Pangasinan
Abra
Apayao
Benguet
Ifugao
Kalinga
Mt. Province

Region I
Region I
Region I
Region I
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR

819.83
821.78
820.15
817.83
830.56
824.10
803.40
813.36
814.96
831.25

1,178.15
989.65
818.88
632.97
2,438.18
3,853.51
1,909.24
2,195.43
2,066.59
2,325.84

(2)

(1)

( ) = negative, CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Province

Per Capita Fiscal Capacity
by Average of Past
Collection Ratios (FC1)

Per Capita Expenditure
Needs by Expenditure
Norms (EN1)

(358.33)
(167.87)
1.27
184.86
(1,607.62)
(3,029.41)
(1,105.85)
(1,382.07)
(1,251.62)
(1,494.58)

(3) = (1)–(2)

Fiscal Gap Measure 1

COMPUTATION OF RELATIVE FISCAL GAPS FOR PROVINCES
(TAKING FISCAL CAPACITY MEASURE 1 AS AN EXAMPLE)

Region
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0.01112
0.00521
(0.00004)
(0.00574)
0.04989
0.09401
0.03432
0.04289
0.03884
0.04638

(4) = (3)/sum(3)

Relative Fiscal Gap
Measure1
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Philippines: Designing a Local Government Enhancement Fund
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units (LGUs) in
the Philippines, the internal revenue allotment, has been criticized for: its inability to equalize
sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer municipalities and provinces, and its funds not having
been spent efficiently. For some time, LGUs have petitioned the Government of the Philippines
to expand the funding of the IRA. However, there appears to be ample consensus that any
additional funding needs to be distributed in a manner that addresses the design flaws of the IRA.
In this paper, options for the design of a possible new transfer, the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure
Performance Fund, separate from the IRA, are outlined. Such design faces four major challenges:
(i) how to define the origin and computation of the additional funding, (ii) how to divide the
additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays), (iii) what formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs
in each particular group of LGUs, and (iv) how to ensure that LGUs will use the additional funds to
improve their service delivery performance. The transfer mechanism suggested as a result offers a
bridge toward the eventual review and reform of the IRA.

Southeast Asia
Working Paper Series

About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing
member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the
region’s many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of the world’s poor: 1.8 billion people who
live on less than $2 a day, with 903 million struggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed
to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and
regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity
investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.

Philippines: Designing a Local Government
Enhancement Fund
Jorge Martínez-Vázquez and Yongzheng Liu
No. 7 | October 2011

Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org/poverty
Publication Stock No. WPS114035
October 2011
Printed on recycled paper.

Printed in the Philippines

